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ABSTRACT 
 
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) has promoted implementing a 
RRS to provide safer care for hospitalized patients. Additionally, the Joint 
Commission made implementing a RRS a 2008 National Patient Safety Goal. 
Although mandated, the evidence to support the effectiveness of a RRS to 
reduce cardiac arrests on hospital medical or surgical floors and un-anticipated 
ICU transfers remains inconclusive, partly because of weak study designs and 
partly due to a failure of published studies to report all critical aspects of their 
intervention. This study attempted to evaluate the effectiveness and the 
implementation of a RRS on the two campuses of the UMass Memorial Medical 
Center (UMMMC). 
The first study presented was an attempt to identify the preventability and 
timeliness of floor to ICU transfers. This was done using 3 chief residents who 
reviewed 100 randomly selected medical records. Using Cohen’s kappa to 
assess the inter-rater reliability it was determined that 13% of the cases could 
have possibly been preventable with earlier intervention.  
The second study was an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Rapid 
Response System. Outcomes were cardiac arrests, code calls and floor to ICU 
admissions. There were two study periods 24 months before the intervention and 
24 months after. A Spline regression model was used to compare the two time 
periods. Though there was a consistent downward trend over all 4 years there 
viii 
 
 
 
were no statistically significant changes in the cardiac arrests and ICU transfers 
when comparing the before and after periods. There was a significant reduction 
in code calls to the floors on the University campus.  
The third study was a modified process evaluation of the Rapid Response 
intervention that will assess fidelity of RRS implementation, the proportion of the 
intended patient population that is reached by the RRS, the overall number of 
RRS calls implemented (dose delivered) and the perceptions of the hospital staff 
affected by the RRS with respect to acceptability and satisfaction with the RRS 
and barriers to utilization. The process evaluation showed that that the Rapid 
Response System was for the most part being used as it was designed, though 
the nurses were not using the specific triggers as a deciding factor in making the 
call. Staff satisfaction with the intervention was very high. 
Overall these studies demonstrated the difficulty in clearly defining outcomes 
and data collection in a large hospital system. Additionally the importance of 
different study designs and analysis methods are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction  
 
Medical errors were the cause of an estimated 98,000 deaths in United States 
hospitals in 1999,1 highlighting the urgent need to maximize patient safety and to 
improve the quality of inpatient care. Even in the over ten years since that first 
report there has been limited movement in terms of improving patient safety. 
Patients admitted to general medical or surgical floors are not always in 
monitored beds, meaning that heart and respiratory rates are not being 
automatically measured, recorded and evaluated by machines designed for this 
purpose. Because of the potential for un-witnessed cardiac arrests and other 
adverse clinical events, hospital inpatient medical-surgical floors have become a 
target for patient safety improvements.   
Several studies have shown that there are some signs of patients’ worsening 
condition hours before patients suffer cardiac arrest2, 3 and that delays in 
adequate care, may be a factor in lower rates of survival.4  These delays  in care 
may be explained by inadequate staff  training to recognize and deal with an 
urgent situation, inefficient systems for contacting a more experienced clinician;  
poor supervision of clinicians, inappropriate staffing and/or a culture that does not 
always support seeking help.3 
           ICU admissions are considered unanticipated if they originate from the 
general hospital floors rather than an operating room or emergency room. Only a 
few studies have assessed the frequency of potentially preventable ICU 
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admissions. A study done in England used two clinician assessors to determine 
the preventability of unanticipated ICU admissions based on a review of 
information in the medical records concerning the recognition, investigation, 
monitoring and management of abnormal cardiac or respiratory findings 
preceding an ICU transfer.5 On average the two assessors considered 4.5% of 
the ICU admissions to be definitely avoidable, 4% probably avoidable and 36% 
possibly avoidable. Both assessors also agreed that 39% of the patients were 
admitted later in their clinical course than they should have been. The patients 
were divided into groups based on the assessment of suboptimal care. Group 1 
included patients that had been well managed. The 2nd group included patients 
that the assessors agreed had received suboptimal care. The 3rd group consisted 
of cases about which there was disagreement between the assessors regarding 
the quality of care provided. Though these groups were similar in case mix, there 
were higher rates of mortality and late ICU admissions in the 2nd group.  The 
assessors decided that the suboptimal care could be attributed, at least in part, to 
1) failures of organizational systems, 2) staff inexperience or deficits in 
knowledge, 3) failure of staff to appreciate the urgency of the clinical situation, 4) 
lack of supervision. and 5) failure to seek advice.3 In another study, relevant 
symptoms and/or significantly abnormal vital signs were observed up to eight 
hours earlier in 60% of the patients that were eventually transferred to the ICU 
from the floor.2  
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Another concern regarding ICU admissions is the timing of the transfers. 
Delays in transfers to the ICU, defined as having occurred over four hours after 
the first recognition of specific relevant physical signs, were associated with an 
increased mortality when compared to transfers that occurred within four hours of 
the documentation of the relevant signs.6 An intervention that facilitates 
identification of patients early in their clinical decline could either prevent an ICU 
admission or facilitate a more timely admission to the ICU. 
 In response to this recognized threat to safer, higher quality care, Australian 
physicians in 1990 developed the concept of the Rapid Response System 
(RRS),7 an intervention that would improve early identification of antecedents of 
cardiac arrest and other adverse events and provide early intervention to reverse 
the clinical decline associated with these signs. The term Rapid Response Team 
or System (RRT or RRS) is primarily used in the United States, whereas Medical 
Emergency Team (MET) or Critical Care Outreach Team (CCOT) is used in 
Europe and Australia.8 In this Thesis the term Rapid Response System (RRS) 
will be used.   
 A RRS typically includes an individual or a team of clinicians called to the 
bedside when a patient’s condition meets one or more criteria from a pre-
determined set of physical signs and symptoms, (e.g. abnormally low or 
abnormally high blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate). A RRS can also be 
activated when a nurse, other hospital staff, patient or visitor has a serious 
concern about the patient even if physical signs are normal. When a patient’s 
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clinical status begins to deteriorate, a chain of six decisions and events must 
occur to produce the optimal response to the change in condition (Figure 1.1):  
1) Hospital staff must identify the change in vital signs or relevant new  
sign or symptom, 
2) The staff must appreciate that the finding requires an urgent evaluation 
3) The staff must notify the appropriate clinician/s of the urgency of the 
situation 
4) The clinical evaluator/s must respond to the request and complete the 
evaluation 
5) The evaluators must reach the correct diagnosis in a timely manner 
6) The optimal treatment must be initiated in a timely manner.   
RRSs are designed to prevent failures at each of the six steps in the process by:  
1) Educating bedside nurses and other staff about the early signs of clinical 
decline 
2) Empowering nurses to seek help in these situations  
3) Providing a process to easily and quickly activate a team of responders 
4) Assuring that the team includes the appropriate expertise and is 
accountable to senior clinicians 
5) Educating clinicians about the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of 
early clinical decline, and facilitating urgent initiation of treatment 
6) Providing a mechanism for the  responding team to develop and 
implement a treatment plan 
5 
 
 
 
 
Change in patient 
condition identified 
Nurse identifies 
change? 
Failure to initiate response 
· Competing priorities 
· Fear of criticism 
· Limited confidence in assessment 
· Urgency not appreciated 
Failure to identify change 
· Vital signs too infrequent 
· Measurement incorrect 
· Vital signs taken late 
(competing priorities) 
Failure to appreciate significance 
· Limited experience 
· Limited training 
Significance of change 
appreciated 
yes 
Nurse appreciates 
significance of 
change? 
no Nurse initiates 
response? 
Evaluation 
completed? 
Correct diagnosis 
and treatment plan? 
Timely 
implementation of 
treatment plan? 
Evaluation completed 
Response initiated 
· Standing orders 
· Call to provider 
Failure to formulate correct diagnosis 
and treatment plan 
· Limited expertise of evaluator 
· Erroneous diagnostic approach 
· Incorrect interpretation of findings 
Failure to evaluate 
· Provider not accessible 
· Provider does not appreciate 
significance/urgency 
· Provider has other priorities 
Correct diagnosis made 
and correct treatments 
ordered Failure to implement treatment plan in 
timely fashion 
· System failures in availability of 
treatments 
· Failure to appreciate urgency 
Correct treatment plan 
implemented in a timely 
fashion 
Patient stabilized 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
Patient clinically 
deteriorating 
Training protocols 
Possible Interventions 
Training Protocols 
Culture Change 
Empower Staff 
Training Protocols 
RRT to call 
Additional training 
Increase expertise 
RRT to call 
FIGURE 1.1: Rapid Response System Conceptual Model 
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RRS of various designs have increasingly been deployed by hospitals in 
Australia, Europe and the United States.9   The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations made implementing a RRS a 2008 
National Patient Safety Goal,10 so there has been an interest in identifying the 
features of a RRS  that are required to effectively and efficiently identify and treat 
patients in clinical decline and to determine the effect of RRS on patient 
outcomes  
Studies of RRS interventions have been done in a variety of settings, 
using a variety of methods to determine the extent to which an RRS can provide 
safer, more efficient care.  The RRS studies to date have varied widely in the 
methods used, analyses done and the outcomes measured. Primary outcomes 
for most RRS studies include unanticipated cardiac arrests; hospital wide 
mortality and unanticipated intensive care unit (ICU) transfers. Each of these 
outcomes have been studied and thought to be preventable with earlier 
recognition and intervention.  
Anecdotal clinical and case reports indicate that hospitals with a RRS reduce 
cardiac arrests outside of the ICU and improve staff and patient satisfaction;11 
however, empirical evidence is somewhat limited.  The only large randomized 
trial showed no difference between the intervention and the control hospitals, 
indicating that the implementation of the RRS may not have had any effect.12  
The use and effectiveness of individual RRS have been evaluated in several 
systematic reviews.13-17 A Cochrane review included two published randomized 
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controlled trials, but excluded all of the other studies because they lacked a post-
intervention control arm, which limited their ability to reach any conclusion about 
effectiveness.16 Three of the  reviews concluded that evidence on the 
effectiveness of a RRS is mixed at best and provides only moderate support for 
claims that RRS’s improve measurable clinical outcomes.13, 15, 17   The final 
review concluded that though the evidence is not strongly supportive of RRS 
effectiveness, there are still compelling reasons to implement a RRS.14 All the 
reviewers recognized that poor quality and heterogeneity of the studies and 
interventions made it difficult to determine effectiveness.   
Primary outcomes that have been evaluated by RRS studies include;  cardiac 
arrest, 12, 18-37 hospital mortality rates,19-21, 23, 24, 29, 33, 35, 36, 38 and unanticipated 
ICU admissions.20, 22, 23, 33, 37  In addition to these primary outcomes, studies have 
evaluated the number of code calls outside of the ICU,37, 39 changes in staffing,23  
length of stay,19, 40 RRS calls compared to code calls,19 and total ICU 
admissions.33  There were variations in how the outcomes were defined and 
measured. For example cardiac arrest as an outcome was defined in four studies 
by specific, objective criteria, including no palpable pulse or the commencement 
of life support.19, 23, 24, 33 Six other studies reported using either code calls or rates 
of cardiac arrest in the hospitals without further description of how these were 
measured.26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 36 All the studies differed in how or if cardiac arrests were 
validated. The studies also varied in whether patients with do not resuscitate 
(DNR) orders were included and what areas of the hospitals were included in the 
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analysis. Similar differences in definitions and measures occurred in the other 
outcomes. The variability in outcomes, study design, implementation and 
reported components make it difficult for the studies to be compared to each 
other and for results to be combined in a meta-analysis.  
Evaluating the effectiveness of a RRS is difficult given the differences in team 
memberships, the complexity and existing culture of the organizations and the 
many barriers to designing and implementing a strong evaluation.  Primary 
among these barriers is the difficulty in deciding on standard definitions for the 
study outcomes and verifying when these definitions have been met. Currently 
most methods to do this are faulty and can under or over estimate the outcomes 
in question. For example to effectively evaluate the impact of a RRS on the 
incidence of in-hospital cardiac arrests inside and outside of the ICU requires a 
standard definition of cardiac arrest that could be used in all RRS studies. 
Differences in both definition and the method for measuring outcomes may 
explain some of the variation in the findings of RRS research. 
In November the 2007 Circulation, the Journal of the American Heart 
Association, published guidelines for monitoring, reporting and conducting 
research on RRS.41 The article emphasized the need for a uniform set of core 
and supplemental data elements to be collected and reported in RRS studies that 
can then be compared and combined to determine best practices and the 
effectiveness of RRS interventions. They provided definitions for a variety of 
9 
 
 
 
outcomes but still did not provide a standard method for measuring and verifying 
the outcomes.  
There is a need for comprehensive, unbiased assessment of RRS that 
include the recommended measures and methodologies proposed by The First 
Consensus Conference on Medical Emergency Teams.3 Ideally, well designed 
randomized trials would be conducted to build the RRS evidence base that is 
needed. However, the mandate of the Joint Commission that all accredited 
hospitals in the U.S. implement an RRS by January 2009 made it unacceptable 
in the U.S. to assign control hospitals to a non-RRS status because failure to 
implement an RRS would be a violation of this Joint Commission standard. 
Though not as strong a study design as a randomized controlled trial, before and 
after single site studies are the most feasible, acceptable alternative for 
evaluating the effectiveness of an RRS intervention in the U.S. Accounting for the 
change in patient case mix over time and for changes in quality improvement 
programs, in staffing, patient care policies and protocols, and diagnostic and 
treatment technologies are serious challenges inherent in this study design that 
few of the published RRS effectiveness studies have effectively addressed. 
Changes in any one of these factors from the pre to post-intervention period 
could have an independent effect on the outcomes being measured in an RRS 
study.  
Patient safety initiatives such as a RRS, like other medical treatment, should 
be evidence-based. However, even with ambiguous evidence, experts at the 
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Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and the Joint Commission believe that 
RRS is an important factor in patient safety.10, 11 When choosing the components 
of a RRS, clinicians and administrators can only rely on published research 
results to determine the best methods for the implementation and evaluation of 
the intervention.  
 Rapid Response Intervention at UMass Memorial Health Care (UMMMC) 
A RRS was fully implemented in January of 2009 at two UMMMC 
hospitals following a brief education 
and pilot period. The rapid response 
team (RRT) consists of the first call 
house officer for patients with house 
staff coverage, the patient’s primary 
nurse, a hospital medicine clinician 
who could be a nurse practitioner 
(NP) or physicians’ assistant (PA) or 
a hospitalist; a nursing supervisor 
and a respiratory therapist. The team 
is activated by any clinical staff, patient or visitor, when trigger signs (Table 1.1) 
are observed, suggesting a clinical decline in a patient’s condition, or when there 
is a concern about a patient’s condition even if a trigger criterion is not observed. 
Patient and visitor activation was added to the intervention in early 2011. The 
clinical leader of the team is a house officer when one is covering the patient and  
Table 1.1: UMMMC Rapid Response 
System Triggers 
 
Heart rate <40 
Heart rate >120 
Systolic BP <90 
Chest pain 
Respiratory rate <6 
Acute drop in O2sat to <90% 
Significant drop in O2sat from 
baseline 
Fi O2 >50% or O2  > 6 lpm 
Decreased level of consciousness 
Agitation, delirium 
Possible stroke 
Seizure 
Marked Concern by Clinical, Staff, 
Patient or Visitor 
11 
 
 
 
is available; otherwise, the hospital medicine clinician is the clinical lead. The 
hospital medicine clinician assists in the assessment of the patient, facilitates 
communication between the primary nurse and other clinicians, and facilitates 
transfer to the ICU when necessary. The nursing manager or supervisor supports 
the team in any transfers and the respiratory therapist aids in any necessary 
respiratory support. The patient’s primary nurse has the responsibility of having 
all the necessary patient information available and communicating it by stating 
the Situation, Background, Assessment and his/her Recommendation (SBAR). 
This provides a consistent method for disseminating information effectively to the 
RRT. When the hospital operators receive a call for the RRT, they immediately 
activate the team using dedicated pagers, and the team is expected to arrive 
within 5 minutes of the page. Figure 1.2 shows the RRS model that was 
implemented at UMMMC.  
The three studies presented in this dissertation thesis were reviewed and 
approved by the University of Massachusetts Institutional Review Board. These 
studies as a whole look at the different elements of developing, implementing 
and evaluating a RRS. The first study is an evaluation and identification of 
preventability and timeliness of floor to ICU admissions. This study demonstrates 
the difficulty in measuring and  
12 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.2 UMass Memorial Medical Center 
Rapid Response System Model 
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identifying these parameters while presenting a unique method for doing so. This 
contributes to the second study which is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
RRS to reduce cardiac arrests outside of the ICU and hospital wide, code calls 
and unanticipated ICU transfers from the general floors. The final study assesses 
how well the RRS has been implemented, and if it is being used as it was 
designed to, using a modified process evaluation. This method of analysis has 
not been previously done in RRS literature. The results of these studies, 
especially when combined with results from other single site studies, will provide 
additional evidence regarding the effectiveness of RRS and aid in a better 
understanding of the factors that make a RRS successful.  
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CHAPTER II 
Preventability And Timeliness Of Floor to ICU Transfer 
 
Introduction/Background 
 
It has been suggested that a RRS can aid in early identification of 
hospitalized patients with emerging critical illness and intervention to stabilize the 
patient’s condition and possibly prevent an ICU transfer. A RRS includes a Rapid 
Response Team (RRT) which is a group called by the primary nurse, other staff, 
patient or their visitors, to the bedside of any patient whose condition is 
deteriorating. In order to measure the impact that an RRT may have on in-
hospital ICU transfers it is first important to understand the scope and nature of 
the problem.  
Only a few studies have assessed in-hospital ICU transfers. A study done 
in England used two clinician assessors to determine the preventability of in-
hospital ICU transfers.5 On average, the two assessors considered 4.5% of the 
ICU transfers to be definitely avoidable, 4% probably avoidable and 36% possibly 
avoidable. Both assessors agreed that 39% of the patients who were admitted to 
the ICU later in their clinical course than they should have been. Failure to 
appreciate clinical urgency, lack of experienced staff, lack of supervision and 
failure to seek advice were all considered possible reasons why preventable 
transfers may have occurred. Another study showed that there were symptoms 
and abnormal vital signs, observed up to 8 hours earlier in 60% of the patients 
that were eventually transferred to the ICU from the floor.2  Ideally, a patient’s 
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declining condition should be identified as soon as possible to insure that 
opportunities are not missed to prevent the development of critical illness. Early 
intervention may prevent an ICU transfer or facilitate an optimally timed transfer 
to the ICU. Delays in transfers from the floors have been associated with poorer 
patient outcomes.6 The RRT has been proposed as an intervention that may 
reduce preventable in hospital ICU transfers.  
Studies that have evaluated RRT’s effectiveness in reducing floor to ICU 
transfer have used different definitions of unanticipated transfers. These included 
any unscheduled transfer to the ICU from the general ward,12 transfers that did 
not originate in the emergency department or the operating rooms, 23, 42 and 
when the patients met the criteria for a RR call but one was not called.33 Two 
studies did not define unanticipated ICU transfers.21, 36  
The results of the previous studies have been mixed. Two studies 
evaluating the impact of RRTs have reported a decrease in the rate of floor to 
ICU transfers;21, 23 two did not find a change12, 33 and two found an increase in 
transfers.33, 42  The differences in findings of these studies raise the question of 
how many floor to ICU transfers can realistically be considered preventable and 
therefore be an appropriate outcome of the RRT. Understanding the extent that 
transfers from the floor to the ICU are preventable is an important first step in 
evaluating the effect that an RRT can have on reducing preventable transfers. 
The objective of this study was to use a standardized medical record review to 
determine the rate of preventable and untimely floor to ICU transfers.  
16 
 
 
 
Methods 
This was a retrospective cohort study taking place at two hospitals 
(University and Memorial Campus) in the same academic medical center in 
central Massachusetts.  All floor to ICU transfers (N=738) from 1/1/2007-
12/31/2007 were identified from ICU records. Transfers that occurred within 24 
hours of hospital admission were excluded (N=291) to avoid evaluating cases 
that may have been more appropriate for direct ICU admission.  Of the 447 
remaining transfers 100 were randomly selected to be evaluated by 3 chief 
residents who each reviewed 40 cases with 10 being reviewed by all three. For 
each patient transferred, nursing progress notes, nursing flow sheets from the 24 
hours prior to the transfer and the ICU admission note were copied directly from 
paper charts and electronic medical databases. All materials were de-identified 
and presented to 3 physician reviewers who were chief residents at the two 
institutions. The physician reviewers were asked to determine the preventability 
and timeliness of the transfer based on their own understanding of the disease 
process and the patients’ response to treatment in context of the patients’ other 
characteristics and decisions of clinicians. 
Analysis 
Kappa analysis is an analytic method used to measure the proportion of 
agreement between reviewers that is beyond what would expected by chance. 
This was done using STATA to compute a kappa coefficient. There is no 
universally agreed upon standard to determine or test the significance of the 
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kappa co-efficient. However, table 2.1 shows the interpretation of the kappa co-
efficient that is has generally accepted. In order to have a sample size large 
enough to detect a kappa statistic of .5 using two reviewers for each patient it 
was necessary for each pair of reviewers to evaluate at least 35 cases.   
Table 2.1: Interpreting Kappa Co-
efficient43 
Kappa Co-efficient  Level of 
Agreement  
<=0  Poor  
0.01-.20  Slight  
0.21-0.40  Fair  
0.41-0.60  Moderate  
0.61-0.80  Substantial  
0.81-1  Almost Perfect  
 
Outcome definitions 
       A preventable transfer was defined in this study as the transfer from hospital 
floor to the ICU of a patient who had observable symptoms, signs, or diagnostic 
test results, in the 24 hours prior to an ICU transfer that, if they had they been 
noticed and intervened upon earlier, could have prevented further clinical decline 
and the need for an ICU transfer.  An untimely transfer was considered one 
where, given the symptoms, the decision to transfer was delayed and care 
continued on the floor past the optimum time.  
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Review Process 
Three reviewers, in three pairs, were asked to score 40 cases per pair 
using a 4 point Likert scale with ratings of definitely preventable, probably 
preventable, possibly preventable and definitely not preventable.  They were also 
asked to indicate which factors in the case or treatment most influenced their 
decision based on the adequacy of the information provided.  
The first 10 cases were presented to all three reviewers. After 
independently scoring each case the reviewers met together with a researcher to 
determine how to handle factors that could complicate reviewers’ efforts to 
classify transfers according to the outcome definition. These included identified 
medical errors that lead to a patient’s initial clinical decline, patients being sent to 
the ICU too early or unnecessarily, records with too little information or poor 
documentation, and assumptions that might be required to interpret some cases. 
When consensus was reached on approaches to each of these issues, each of 
the remaining cases was assigned to two reviewers, 10 at a time. After each set 
were scored the reviewers met in pairs to discuss any disagreements and where 
possible a consensus rating was reached.  
Statistical Analysis 
Frequencies of all variables were compared between the two campuses 
and statistically significant differences were identified using either a chi square or 
Fisher’s exact test. Consensus ratings were used for all calculations. For 
preventability and timeliness, raw agreement between each member of a pair as 
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well as among all three reviewers was calculated.  A Kappa statistic was used to 
determine if the degree of agreement between reviewers varied from chance and 
the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, an evaluation of agreement between and 
across reviewers, was calculated as a comparison to the Kappa statistic.  The 
consensus ratings were collapsed from the four original categories to two, 
combining definitely not and probably not preventable/timely, and definitely and 
probably preventable/timely. Raw agreement and kappa were then calculated for 
these new categories.  
Results  
 Characteristics of the patients reviewed in this study are presented in 
Table 2.2. Table 2.3 displays the difference if any in patient characteristics when 
stratified by campus or agreement. No differences were detected in any category 
except age where patients at the Memorial campus were, on average, older than 
patients at the University campus.  There was a higher mortality rate among the 
cases that the reviewers agreed were preventable. This did not reach 
conventional statistical significance (p<0.05). 
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Table 2.2 Study Population Demographics by Campus 
 University 
n (%) 
Memorial 
n (%) 
p-
value 
Total number of pts 54 46   
    
Sex   0.896 
Male  31 (57) 27 (59)  
Female 23 (43) 19 (41)  
    
Age (Mean) 62.24 71.22 0.058 
 40 and under 4 (7) 2 (4)  
41-50 7 (13) 4 (9)  
51-60 13 (24) 7 (15)  
61-70 12 (22) 5 (11)  
71-80 12 (22) 11(24)  
81-90 5 (9) 16 (35)  
over 90 1 (2) 1 (2)  
    
Days on Floor    0.138 
4 and under 29 (54) 29(63)  
 5-10 14 (26) 14 (30)  
Over 10 11 (20) 3 (7)  
    
Hospital Admitting Diagnosis  0.581 
CHF 8 (15)  5 (11)  
Other heart disease 2 (4) 1(2)  
Renal 2 (4) 3(6)  
Pneumonia 3 (6) 5(11)  
Other respiratory 3 (6) 3 (7)  
Liver disease 7 (13) 1 (2)  
Infection  6 (11) 5(11)  
Cancer 8(15) 6 (13)  
GI 2 (4) 5 (11)  
 Stroke 2 (4) 6(130  
Ortho 3(6) 8(17)  
Hemotologic 1 (2) 1(2)  
Sepsis 2 (4) 2(4)  
Other 5 (9) 4(9)  
    
Disposition   0.465 
Home self care 5(9) 1 (2)   
Home health care 9(17) 12 (26)  
Acute rehab facility 6 (11) 6 (13)  
Expired 17 (3) 12 (26)  
Hospice Medical Facility 2 (4) 1 (2)  
Long term care hospital 6 (11) 2 (4)  
Skilled nursing facility 9 (17) 11 (24)  
Against Medical Advice 0 1 (2)  
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Table 2.3 Patient Demographics by Study Outcome 
 Agree not-preventable 
Agree 
preventable Disagree P-Value 
 n (%) n (%) n (%)  
Total number of pts 74 (100) 13 (100) 13 (100)  
Sex    0.663 
Male 45 (78) 8 (14) 5 (9)  
Female 31 (74) 5 (12) 6 (14)  
     
Age (Mean) 69.3 66.70 61.53 0.555 
40 and under 5(83) 0 (0) 1(17)  
41-50 7 (64) 2 (18) 2 (18)  
51-60 14 (70) 2 (10) 4 (20)  
61-70 14 (82) 2 (12) 1 (6)  
71-80 16 (70) 5 (22) 2 (9)  
81-90 19 (91) 1 (5) 1 (5)  
over 90 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 (0)  
Total 76 (76) 13 (13) 11 (11)  
     
Days on Floor    0.559 
4 and under 43 (74) 8 (14) 7 (12)  
5-10 21 (75) 5 (18) 2 (7)  
Over 10 12 (86) 0 (0) 2 (14)  
     
Admitting Diagnosis    0.528 
CHF 11 (86) 1 (7) 1 (7)  
Other heart disease 2 (67) 0 (0) 1 (33)  
Renal 5 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Pneumonia 5 (62) 3 (38) 0 (0)  
Other respiratory 4 (66) 1(17) 1(17)  
Liver disease 7 (88) 0 (0) 1(12)  
Infection 8 (73) 2 (18) 1(9)  
Cancer 10 (13) 2(15) 2(15)  
GI 9 (90) 1 (10) 0 (0)  
Stroke 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Ortho 4 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Hemotologic 2 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Sepsis 3 (75) 1 (25) 0 (0)  
Other 3 (33) 2 (22) 4 (45)  
     
Disposition    0.845 
Home self care 5 (83) 0 (0) 1 (17)  
Home health care 13 (71) 2 (10) 6 (19)  
Acute rehab facility 10 (83) 2 (17) 0 (0)  
Expired 21(72) 6 (21) 2 (7)  
Hospice Medical Facility 2 (67) 0 (0) 1 (33)  
Long term care hospital 6 (75) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5)  
Skilled nursing facility 16(80) 2 (10) 2 (10)  
Against Medical Advice 1 (100) 0(0) 0(0)  
22 
 
 
 
Overall, raw agreement on preventability when the categories were 
collapsed was 87%, In 13 cases, even with discussion; the reviewers were not 
able to come to a consensus. (Table 2.4) Collapsing the 4 categories of 
preventability into 2 resulted in a higher Kappa statistic though in both cases the 
Kappa demonstrates agreement beyond the level of chance. The collapsed 
Kappa statistic showed moderate agreement among reviewers A/C, and B /C. 
There was substantial agreement between reviewers A/B. The Interclass 
Correlation was calculated as a comparison to the Kappa statistic and was low 
among all the reviewers.  
Raw agreement on timeliness was similar to the preventability raw 
agreement, however when a Kappa statistic was calculated the scores were very 
low. Collapsing the categories improved the scores but not enough to show much 
more than agreement above chance.  
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The 13 cases in which the reviewers were not able to come to a 
consensus are described in table 2.5. Two of these cases had poor 
documentation and both reviewers felt that making a determination was not 
possible. Of the other cases, there was disagreement on type and 
appropriateness of treatment in 7 and a disagreement in diagnosis in one. In the 
final case, there was disagreement in whether the patient needed the ICU or if 
they were stable on the floor.   
  
Table 2.4 Preventability and Timeliness of Floor to ICU Transfers 
 Reviewers 
A and B 
Reviewers 
B and C 
Reviewers 
A and C 
All three 
Reviewers  
Raw agreement (4) 
 
63% 63% 64% 63% 
Kappa Preventability (4) 
 
0.37 0.35 0.41 0.47 
Raw agreement Collapsed(2) 
 
89% 85% 87% 87% 
Kappa Preventability Collapsed 
(2) 
 
0.73 0.60 0.60 0.60 
ICC Preventability 
 
N/A N/A N/A 0.48 
Raw agreement Timeliness 
 
69% 63% 56% N/A 
Kappa Timeliness (4) 
 
0 0.14 0.35 N/A 
Kappa Timeliness (2) 
 
-0.02  0.15  0.29  N/A  
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Table 2.5: Reasons for Disagreement by Hospital Reviewers of ICU Transfers 
Study ID Disagreement  
 Reason: Not Preventable Reason: Preventable  Category 
19 Poor prognosis  better treatment on 
floor  
Treatment 
45 Closer supervision necessary Delay in getting 
imaging 
Treatment 
55 Pulmonary embolus Remove mucus plug, 
Chest Physical 
Therapy 
Treatment 
110 History of heart disease, post-
op 
Patient stable on the 
floor 
Transfer decision 
132 Pleural effusion, resp. distress, 
multiple co-morbidities 
Question of 
appropriate antibiotic 
on floor 
Treatment 
349 Underwent large volume 
paracentesis, closer monitoring 
necessary 
Patient was stable on 
floor 
Treatment 
409 Poor documentation    
459 Poor documentation   
468 Ablation abnormal cardiac 
tissue would not have worked 
Ablation would have 
prevented the transfer 
Treatment  
581 Lower GI bleed with significant 
HCT drop 
Decision to go to CCU 
made by present of 
blood not instability 
 
642 Seizure  Narcotics Diagnosis 
692 High FiO2 requirements  Post op patient  
699 Worsening hypoxemia 2nd to 
pleural effusions 
Pleural effusions 
could have been 
drained sooner 
Treatment 
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There were 13 transfers that the reviewers agreed were either probably or 
definitely preventable. The reason for preventability and the suggestions for what 
could have been done differently to prevent the transfer are reported in Table 
2.6. Of the preventable cases, 8 were deemed preventable because of poor 
medication management. Of these, 4 were thought to have needed broad 
antibiotic coverage to prevent the transfer. Two of the cases were determined to 
be preventable because a full resuscitation was done on patients with DNR 
orders and transfers were required once they had been resuscitated. The 
reviewers disagreed in two cases as to the primary factor that could have 
prevented the transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: What Could Have Been Done 
to Prevent Transfer? 
Study 
ID 
Physician Reviewer Comments 
10 Earlier recognition of CHF and 
diuretic use / K+ repletion 
11 More aggressive pain and BP 
control 
103 Attention to code status 
190 Broad spectrum antibiotics 
210 Early labs and CT 
222 Broad spectrum antibiotics 
272 Better opiod management 
313 Broad spectrum antibiotics 
369 Broad spectrum antibiotics 
374 Better management on floor; not a 
necessary transfer 
417 Better blood sugar control 
436 Attention to code status 
515 Earlier antiseizure medication 
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Discussion 
 
This study demonstrated that possibly 13% of floor to ICU transfers could 
have been prevented with faster higher level treatment. Eight were deemed to be 
preventable because of poor medical management. The implications of poor 
medical management is something that would need to be investigated further to 
determine how many patients are being transferred to the ICU because of either 
not the correct or poorly timed antibiotic. In this study, there were three residents 
giving their opinion based on what they think they would have done in similar 
circumstances. Though they did their best to put themselves into the shoes of the 
treating clinicians, knowing the outcome specifically that the course of treatment 
did not work, may have made their decisions different then if they had been 
there.  
 In order to verify the occurrence of a preventable transfer due to poor 
medication management, it would be necessary to have pre-determined criteria 
as to what the proper medication procedure would be and then evaluate how 
many patients received this intervention. This would still be a complicated study 
to do because there is nothing that predicts how a patient is going to respond to 
medication. A medication regime that would be effective for one patient may not 
be the same for another.    
Preventing unnecessary transfers not only provides a higher quality care 
for patients but also uses hospital resources more efficiently. For clinicians, the 
intensive care unit provides the highest level of monitoring and support for 
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patients in critical condition.  Thibault and colleagues found that the perceived 
need for noninvasive monitoring rather than a need for immediate major 
interventions was the major reason for admission to a medical intensive care 
unit.44 Their study showed that three out of four patients were admitted to the 
intensive care unit because of concerns about possible complications that would 
necessitate major diagnostic or therapeutic interventions, however, only ten 
percent subsequently required such interventions.  
The decision to transfer patients to the intensive care unit is complex. In 
addition to the diagnosis, clinicians have to account for the wishes of the patient 
for further aggressive care in addition to clinical factors such as hemodynamic 
stability, prognosis, frequency of checks, blood draws, pulmonary toilet, 
medication usage, and the type and number of organs failing. The decision to 
transfer is often further complicated by the lack of clinical information. The 
patients’ preferred code status is frequently unclear, undocumented, inaccurate 
or undecided for patients who cannot express themselves such as elderly 
patients with dementia, altered mental status, or acute distress.  Many do-not-
resuscitate orders are written only shortly before death, further suggesting that 
the decision may be biased by the patient’s process of dying.45 The sheer 
distress of the dying patient, family members at the bedside, and involved health 
care staff is often enormous and stressful and, may impact the clinician’s ability 
to discern preventable critical from non-critical events.   
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The health care staff closest to the point of care may have cues that result 
in earlier recognition of a change in clinical status. Strategies to deploy resources 
at this point, such as the implementation of rapid response teams, may have 
multiple benefits for patient care and safety.  Since December 2008, the Joint 
Commission’s National Patient Safety Goals have required hospitals to develop 
rapid response teams. Although intuitively sensible, the effectiveness of, the 
optimal composition of, and the best triggers for activating rapid response teams 
have been questioned.13, 46, 47 
Rapid response teams may act as a mechanism to direct patients to the 
appropriate care unit if the optimal triggers for activation and clinical parameters 
are identified. To identify these factors, it is first important to understand the rate 
of preventable ICU transfers. This study attempted to measure the rate of 
preventability and timeliness using a simple, easily replicated method. Given the 
results of this study, it is possible that earlier, higher level interventions in the 
form of an RR could reduce floor to ICU transfers by 13%. Excluded from this 
study were 291 transfers (39%) that occurred within 24 hours of initial 
admissions. It is likely that in most of these cases the patients were initially 
triaged to the wrong unit. Though not assessed in this study the RRT may have 
the greatest effect on these patients in providing a more rapid assessment and 
transfer to the ICU from the floor.46  A portion of the patients who are admitted to 
the floor and within 24 hours are transferred to the ICU are likely to have been 
incorrectly triaged. Thirty-nine percent of all ICU admissions fall into this 
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category. Of those a certain percentage are going to be patients where a clinical 
decline is quick and unpredictable. The RRS could have an effect on the patients 
who have been triaged incorrectly to the floor in two ways. First, would be the 
direct care that the RRS would provide. Second, the RRS could serve as an 
educational tool to improve the triage process.  
There were many issues that may have impacted the results of this study: 
variations in physicians’ method of evaluation of cases, limited information 
available for some cases, limited time for reviewers to study the cases, the 
approach to medical errors and other variations in the cases. The three physician 
reviewers were chief residents at the same academic medical center. Though all 
three had similar training, there were differences in the way they initially 
evaluated the cases.  There was much discussion on whether patients who had a 
poor prognosis would have received better care in the ICU or on the floor and 
what level of monitoring and interventions the patients may have preferred.  In 
this study transfers for patients with a poor prognosis were considered not 
preventable. All three agreed that the RRT could play an important role in these 
cases by initiating end of life conversations with the patient and the family. 
Surprisingly, there were a few cases where the reviewers did not think that the 
transfers should have happened at all. With limited ICU beds available, only 
appropriate patients should be transferred to the ICU. In these cases, a RRT may 
play an important role in helping to stabilize a patient on the floor and preventing 
the transfer.  
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Doing a retrospective review of medical charts raised the question, 
whether having more information and the time to consider all possible 
interventions would give the reviewers an insight that the treating physicians may 
not have had.  The physicians made every effort to put themselves in the shoes 
of the treating physician and judge the treatment as if they themselves were 
making the decision at the time.  
  This study was not trying to identify errors in diagnosis or treatment that 
led to the initial clinical decline of the patient the reviewers were to determine 
whether once symptoms of the decline were present, within the 24 hours prior to 
the transfer could the ICU transfer been prevented. There were several cases 
where the reviewers identified medical errors that ultimately led to a transfer.  
RRS may be effective in identifying and mitigating the impact of medical error. 
The cases where sepsis was a concern presented differences in the reviewers’ 
approach to treatment of a person with sepsis. Specifically, a reviewer would rate 
the case as preventable if they thought that the patient should be treated on the 
floor with antibiotics but not-preventable if it was felt that all patients with any 
sepsis type symptoms should immediately go to the ICU.  
The instrument to measure timeliness proved to be an ineffective tool.  
Even after multiple conversations there was still confusion over the definition of 
this measure, which was to be based on the time from identification of the 
symptom/s and signs of the condition that required a transfer to the time of the 
decision to transfer the patient to the ICU, not the time of the actual transfer.  
31 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Physician Review Comments on Cases Agreed to be Preventable 
 Reviewer 1 Reviewer 2 
Study 
ID 
Predominant Factor What could have 
been done 
Predominant 
Factor 
What could 
have been 
done  
10 The past medical 
history suggested a 
CHF history that is 
consistent with SX. No 
CXR was ordered on 
the first day that SX 
presented (1/4/07 @ 
3am) Increased HR 
140-160 @ 1 am 
1/5/07  
 
Earlier recognition if 
CHF and diuretic use 
may have been 
helpful. This DX 
should have been 
priority to make over 
anxiety. COPD 
component is being 
treated already 
The patient had a 
low potassium (3.6) 
and depressed EF 
which may have led 
to her coding 
 
K+ Repletion 
 
11 The patient was 
transferred to the ICU 
for pain control and 
hypertension. There is 
no documentation as 
to how the patient was 
managed on the floor 
but usually pain and 
?MTN can be 
managed on a regular 
floor  
 
More aggressive 
pain and BP control  
 
Originally disagreed 
but changed mind 
after discussion 
 
103 The patient was 
transferred to the CCU 
because they were 
coded. Pts code status 
was DNR/DNI but it 
was improperly 
documented. If the 
code status was 
known she wouldn't 
have been coded and 
would have likely died 
on the floor and not 
been transferred to the 
ICU  
 
attention to code 
status 
 
Pt was DNR/DNI but 
a code was called. 
Both agreed that  
she should not have 
been coded and 
transferred. They 
scored it differently 
but meant the same 
thing. Pt should not 
have been 
transferred but once 
she coded and was 
recuscitated she 
had to be 
transferred. 
 
 
190 The patient developed 
resp. failure 2nd to 
PNA. She may not 
have deteriorated if 
she had broader 
antibiotic coverage  
 
She was slowly 
declining for >12 
hours before ICU 
transfer. Initial 
antibiotic choice may 
have prevented 
transfer or 
Earlier treatment of 
aspiration 
PNA/Hospital 
acquired pneumonia 
with broad coverage 
antibiotics 
 
Early treatment 
with antibiotics 
Instead of 
treatment for 
community 
acquired 
pneumonia  
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broadening antibiotic 
coverage may have 
been preventative.  
 
 
210 Patient was admitted 
with a COPD 
exacerbation but 
subsequently develops 
AMS and abdominal 
distention with 
elevated HR 100 
 
There were no labs 
in the 24hr period 
prior to transfer/code 
blue. Patient needed 
CT abdomen, ABG, 
Chemistries, prior to 
the ICU admit. His 
ph was 7.14 by the 
time he arrived in the 
ICU Rx bicarb, 
Bipap, look for 
necrosis, dialysis. 
Full abd exam 
needed parenthesis 
(large volume) 
 
The patient 
developed v-fib and 
coded, while the 
precipitating event is 
unclear. The patient 
had electrolyte 
abnormalities that 
may have 
contributed 
 
There were 
electrolyte 
abnormalities 
upon arrival to 
the ICU and it 
doesn't appear 
electrolytes 
were checked 
in the 24 hours 
prior to transfer 
 
222 Inadequate antibiotics 
coverage initially when 
infection is pleural fluid 
suspected. Patient was 
only covered with 
levaquin (with no 
coverage of MRSA in 
patient with pigtail 
catheter in the pleural 
space) 
 
Starting broad 
antibiotic coverage 
earlier  
 
This patient had 
turbid fluid drained 
from his therapeutic 
thoraccentesis. This 
patient needed an 
emergent chest 
tube.  
 
The patient 
could have had 
his heart rate 
better 
controlled.  
 
272 Unresponsive. On 
opioids for pain mgt of 
mets rectal ca. 
 
Closer look of 
opioids not to be 
given in excess 
resulting in mental 
status change, 
unresponsiveness. 
Closer look at pt's 
insulin pump, pt has 
a basal rate at 0.50/h 
and at 1:30 given 
himself 3.7 u bolus of 
insulin on ambalt to 
ICU, blood glc is 28 
 
Pt likely could have 
been managed on 
the floor he was 
transferred for an 
unresponsive 
episode in the 
setting of low blood 
sugar while he was 
wearing an insulin 
pump 
 
Insulin pum 
while in hospital 
with altered 
mental status 
 
313 Patient was transferred 
to ICU for hyperemia 
presumed 2nd to PNA. 
The patient came from 
a group home but was 
only started on ?? 
Upon admission 
Earlier broad 
spectrum antibiotics  
 
They used the 
wrong IVR Should 
have used 1/2 NS 
instead of DSW 
 
needed to use 
1/2 NS 
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369 The patient was 
transferred for 
hypertension/sepsis. 
At admission the 
hypotension was 
thought to be hypo?? 
Not septic  
 
Earlier broad 
spectrum antibiotics  
 
Found by VNA @ 
home with 
hypotension and 
weakness on 6/25. 
Pt was hypotensive, 
exhibit early signs of 
SIRS, Rx for 
cellulites with 
clindamycin as pts 
PCN-allergic. On 
6/26 pm, increased 
O2 requirement, 
continue to be 
hypotensive given 
by NF overnight 
broad ABX 
coverage 
 
Early broad 
coverage ABX 
administration 
for SIRS/sepsis 
 
374 Both were unclear 
what precipitated the 
transfer. Both thought 
it was not a necessary 
transfer 
 
   
417 Transfer to ICU seems 
to be due to only 
poorly controlled 
hyperglycemia 
 
Tighter blood g/c 
control with the ??? 
Dose of long lasting 
insulin pre-op, during 
op, and post op with 
giving insulin with 
meals and not 
relying only on 
insulin sliding scale. 
Obtaining 
endocrinology 
general medicine 
consult early if 
needed for tighter 
blood glucose control 
 
The patient was 
transferred to the 
ICU for on insulin 
drip because of 
hyperglycemia that 
could have been 
avoided with more 
aggressive 
management on the 
floor. The patient 
also missed a dose 
of insulin post-op 
that contributed 
 
Insulin could 
have been 
restarted pot-
op. When the 
sugar was 
difficult to 
control 
endocrine 
could have 
over 
constructed 
 
436 End stage disease with 
directives not to 
transfer to ICU  
 
Attention to 
documented wishes 
of pt and family 
 
Patient was 
DNR/DNI and 
should not have 
gone to the ICU. 
Both reviewers 
agreed with this but 
scored it differently. 
Decided to score as 
preventable, 
because it should 
not have happened. 
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There are two levels of timeliness that are important to consider in terms 
of the quality of care provided to a patient prior a floor to ICU transfer; 1) the 
amount of time it took a care team to identify the need for an ICU transfer based 
on presenting symptoms and 2) the time that the transfer actually occurred once 
the decision was made. Though both are equally important, the former involves 
clinical judgment and the latter situations that are mainly out of the providers’ 
hands because of issues such as number of ICU beds or availability of patient 
transport personnel. In this study, it was difficult to determine the timing from the 
point that symptoms were recognized to the time the decision to transfer was 
made using the information available.  Future research is needed in order to 
determine the timeliness of clinician decisions about the need for an ICU transfer. 
This would be best done as a prospective study with the ability to debrief 
physician and nurses at the time of the transfer or shortly after.  
A limitation of this study was that it was retrospective. Of the 13 cases 
where there was agreement regarding preventability, it is still unclear if these 
reviewers would have made any different choices than the providers had they 
 
515 Left sided neglect 
(9/17/07), lethargic 
decreased mental 
status) post 
neurosurgery. 
Reasonable to 
consider active 
seizures plus no 
response to narcan 
 
Early loading doses 
of antiseizure 
medications vs early 
EEG 
 
It was thought the pt 
may have had a 
seizure leading to 
unresponsiveness 
and ICU transfer. 
His dilantin level 
was low which may 
have precipitated 
the seizure. 
 
Therapeutic 
dilantin 
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been there at the time. A 13 percent preventability rate in floor to ICU transfers 
suggests an important area for further research, both for better quality of care 
and management of resources. 
Conclusion 
This study did show some success with the methods used to determine a 
preventability rate. The methods used in this study were unique in that the 
reviewers were given standardized information about each patient. About half of 
the cases were thought to have enough information to make a determination of 
preventability. With a few modifications this method allowed portability of the 
information to be reviewed so that the reviewers were able to do the work when 
convenient, did not require reviewers to access or review entire charts for each 
patient, and all the reviewers made their determination based on the same 
information. The Kappa scores showed that the level of agreement reached was 
higher than what would have happened by chance. 
The measurement for timeliness was not an effective measurement. 
Future studies should focus on measuring the time from when symptoms are first 
observed and documented to the time that a decision to transfer a patient to the 
ICU. This is important to better understand the differences that a more timely 
transfer might make on a patients ultimate outcome. In order to effectively and 
accurately measure timeliness it is first necessary to determine a set of 
symptoms to be identified as being a signal that a ICU transfer may be 
necessary. The system used in this study did not define specific symptoms and 
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the information given was not extensive enough to establish a clear idea of the 
timing. Future studies that look at what antecedents were in the available medical 
record before a decision to transfer was made would contribute to the existing 
literature and help to understand what an intervention like the RRS might impact.  
The best method for measuring timeliness might be to evaluate the actual 
time from the first documented symptom that would indicate a need to transfer. 
This could be done by documenting the time and date of when the decision to 
transfer took place and a medical chart review would provide the time of the first 
symptom. The amount of time between the two might indicate that there was 
something that could be improved.  
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CHAPTER III 
Rapid Response System’s Impact on Code Calls, Cardiac Arrests, and 
Floor to ICU Transfers 
 
Introduction 
A rapid response system (RRS) is a hospital program that provides the 
means for bringing qualified clinicians immediately to the bedsides of patients 
who are experiencing significant clinical decline outside of the intensive care unit 
(ICU) setting. These declines are usually manifest by the occurrence of one or 
more “trigger” signs such as low blood pressure or increased heart or respiratory 
rate. The objective of a RRS is early identification of a clinical decline with 
effective early intervention to prevent further decline, cardiac arrest and death. 
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) has promoted 
implementing RRS’s to provide safer care for hospitalized patients 11 and the 
Joint Commission made implementing a RRS a 2008 National Patient Safety 
Goal.10 Although RRSs are now mandated for all hospitals in the United Sates, 
the evidence to support the effectiveness of any RRS to reduce cardiac arrests 
on hospital medical or surgical floors, un-anticipated ICU transfers and over-all 
hospital mortality rates remains inconclusive. This is partly because of weak 
study designs and partly due to a failure of published studies to report all critical 
aspects of their intervention. Recently, two published reports have proposed 
guidelines for the methodological components that should be included in 
published RRS studies.41, 48 This study will evaluate the effectiveness of a RRS in 
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hospitals on the two campuses of the UMass Memorial Medical Center 
(UMMMC).  
Background 
Cardiac arrests that occur outside of the ICU, emergency room (ER) and 
operating room (OR) are considered unanticipated, meaning that a patient was 
presumed to have a very low probability of such an event and thus could safely 
be cared for on a general hospital floor with limited or no cardiac monitoring. A 
few studies to date have examined the occurrence of unanticipated cardiac 
arrests and how often they may be preventable. A study done in the United 
Kingdom used a panel of clinicians to evaluate in-hospital cardiac arrests. This 
study suggested that 68% of the cardiac arrests were potentially avoidable.49  
This study further concluded that 100% of these patients had not received 
adequate care in the 24 hours before the arrest, even though there were signs 
suggesting deterioration in their condition. Similarly, a study in Italy found that 
89% of the patients who had an in-hospital cardiac arrest outside the ICU had 
observable signs of deterioration before the arrest. Of these patients, depending 
on the type of antecedent sign, 23-81% of patients did not receive appropriate 
care in response to antecedent signs, in the judgment of the authors.50 A study 
done in the United States found similar outcomes, with 84% of patients outside 
the ICU showing signs of deterioration or a significant, relevant new complaint 
within eight hours before the arrest.51 These initial studies suggest that an 
intervention that identifies these antecedents early and effectively treats the 
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condition/s underlying the antecedent signs may reduce the rate of cardiac 
arrests on general hospital floors.  
The code team in a hospital is designed to be activated when a patient is 
in cardiac or respiratory arrest or other life threatening condition. Some hospitals 
have replaced their code teams with a rapid response team or have the code 
team also act as the rapid response team. At UMMMC when a patient is 
arresting outside of an ICU, the entire code team is activated, and they bring with 
them the equipment needed to perform advanced life saving procedures. All 
code blue calls at both UMMMC campuses are made through the 
telecommunications office, which documents time, location, and nature of the 
calls and pages the code team members. The objective of this study was to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a newly implemented Rapid Response System in 
reducing cardiac arrests in and out of the ICU and hospital wide, and to evaluate 
the changes in the rates and use of code calls. Admissions to the ICU are 
considered unanticipated if they originate from general medical/surgical care 
units as opposed to the operating rooms or the emergency departments.  
Setting 
This study was conducted in the 2 hospitals on the main campuses of the 
UMMMC, located in Worcester, Massachusetts. The hospitals provide care for 
patients from the city of Worcester and from elsewhere in Worcester County. 
With more than 700 acute care beds, UMMMC is the largest acute care provider 
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in central Massachusetts.  UMMMC hospitals are level 1 tertiary care, teaching 
institutions with an average admission rate of 3600 patients per month.  
Intervention  
A RRS was fully implemented in January of 2009 at both UMMMC 
hospitals following a brief education and pilot period. The rapid response team 
(RRT) consists of the first call house officer, hospital medicine clinician, a nursing 
supervisor and a respiratory therapist. The team can be activated by any clinical 
staff when one or more trigger signs are observed, suggesting a clinical decline 
in a patient’s condition. Clinical staff also has the option to activate the RRT 
when they are concerned about a patient’s condition even if a trigger criterion is 
not observed.  
Methods 
 This was a before/after study design to evaluate the effectiveness of the RRS 
intervention. The 2 years before the intervention 01/01/2007 to 12/31/2008 and the 2 
years after, 1/01/2009 to 12/31/2010, were compared. A pilot RRS model was performed 
during the last two weeks of 2008 on two floors at each hospital. This time period was 
included in the before period because of the limited number of floors and calls received.  
Code calls are recorded by UMMMC telecommunications. This log 
includes date and time of call and floor but no other identifying information. The 
code team does not keep record of all calls but does fill out a code sheet when 
the code cart is used. Discharge codes of cardiac arrest are assigned to any 
patient who experiences a cardiac arrest during his or her hospital stay. In order 
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to verify that a cardiac arrest, as defined for this study, had occurred, all code 
calls, code sheets and discharge codes were cross referenced with each other. 
Additionally all discharge codes were reviewed in an electronic data base 
(Meditech) to identify the occurrence and location of the arrest.  The rate of code 
calls and cardiac arrests were calculated patient days in the hospital units 
included.  
All floor to ICU transfers were identified using Meditech. Each transfer was 
considered unique so one patient may have had more than one transfer to the 
ICU. Excluded were any transfers to the ICU from the emergency department or 
the operating rooms.  
 Data on RRS events was collected using a Rapid Response Event 
Record developed specifically for this study, which was filled out by the 
responding hospital medicine clinician during and immediately after the event. 
This record includes information regarding the Rapid Response (RR) trigger, 
treatment during the call, and outcome of the patient. Also included are several 
questions regarding the RR responding clinician opinion of how the call went and 
an evaluation of the team. Additional information regarding the RR calls (time of 
call, event  
location) and all code calls were collected from Telecommunications. Only adult 
in-patients were included in the study. Table 3.1 describes the outcome 
definitions and measures. 
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Table 3.1: Rapid Response Outcome Definitions and Measures  
 RR 
Calls 
Cardiac 
Arrests 
(Med-
Surg 
Only) 
Cardiac 
Arrests  
Hospital 
Wide 
Cardiac 
Arrest 
ICU Only 
Code Calls 
(Floors 
Only) 
Floor to ICU 
Transfers 
Measure 
description  
Rate of 
Rapid 
Respon
se calls 
Cardiac or 
Respirator
y arrests 
that occur 
outside of 
the ED, 
OR, ICU 
or 
diagnostic 
areas. 
All 
Cardiac 
arrests  
that occur 
anywhere 
in the 
hospital 
Rate of 
Cardiac 
Arrests in 
the ICU 
Code calls 
received by 
telecommuni
cations that 
originate 
from the 
floors 
All transfers 
from the 
floor to the 
ICU  
Operational 
Definition 
The 
number 
of calls 
received 
telecom
municati
ons 
Any 
Cardiac or 
respiratory 
which 
required 
CPR, 
ACLS was 
considere
d as well 
as all 
asystole 
or PEA.  
All 
cardiac/re
spiratory 
arrests, 
which 
required 
CPR, 
ACLS was 
considere
d as well 
as 
asystole 
or PEA. 
Includes 
OR, ED 
and ICU.  
All Cardiac 
Arrest that 
occurred in 
the ICU only 
and required  
CPR, ACLS 
was 
considered 
as well as 
asystole or 
PEA 
All code 
calls per 
month by 
unit 
Transfers 
that do not 
originate 
from the ER 
or OR 
Denominator 1000 
patient 
days 
1000 
patient 
days 
1000 
patient 
days 
1000 patient 
days 
1000 patient 
days 
1000 patient 
days 
Data collection 
Method 
Rapid 
Respon
se 
Event 
forms 
and 
telecom
municati
on 
records 
Arrests 
identified 
by ICD9 
discharge 
code and 
verified by 
Medical 
Record 
Review 
Arrests 
identified 
by ICD9 
discharge 
code and 
verified by 
Medical 
Record 
Review 
Arrests 
identified by 
ICD9 
discharge 
code and 
verified by 
Medical 
Record 
Review 
Telecommu
nications 
records of 
calls outside 
of the ICU, 
ED and OR.  
Meditech  
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Statistical Analysis 
  There were two study periods, for evaluation of cardiac arrests and code 
calls, 1/01/2007 to 12/31/2008 (before the intervention) and 1/01/2009 to 
12/31/2010 (after the intervention). Floor to ICU transfers included the 12 months 
before the intervention and the 24 months following the intervention.  The 
incidence rates of cardiac and respiratory arrest, of unanticipated transfers from 
the general floor to an ICU, and of code calls before and after the intervention, 
were analyzed separately.  Each outcome rate was graphed with a locally 
weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) curve. There were three statistical 
tests to determine any change in the rates of the outcomes. Initially a t-test 
compared the means to determine if the mean rates changed before and after. A 
linear regression was done to evaluate the trend of the outcome over the entire 4 
year study period. Then a test of significance for the Spline knot at 1/1/2009 was 
done. If that test was significant, a Spline regression model was used to evaluate 
differences in the slopes before and after the intervention, using rates of cardiac 
arrests, code calls and ICU transfers by month as the dependent variable and 
study months since 1/01/2007 as the major independent variable. The beginning 
of full implementation, 1/01/2009 was used in the Spine analysis as the knot so 
that the core model was    Y= 22110 TT     where T1 is the months since 
1/01/2007, T2 = T1 – 24 if T1>24, otherwise T2 = 0. 1  is the slope to reflect the 
trend during the period before intervention, 2  is the change in the slope in going 
from the first period to the after period. This analysis will show if there is any 
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trend over time and if the trends are different between two study periods. STATA 
software was used to do the analysis. Frequency tables were developed for 
triggers, bedside interventions and patient disposition following a RRS 
intervention.  
According to data collected before the study period, the estimated 
incidence of cardiac arrests on the general hospital floors was 1/1000 
discharges, in-hospital mortality was 10/1000 discharges, and the ICU transfer 
rate was 20/1000 discharges. Some studies have shown that a RRS could 
decrease cardiac and respiratory arrest rates by as much as 50%, decrease in-
hospital mortality by 30% to 40%, and decrease ICU transfers by 15%. To 
calculate the power necessary for this study, we assumed that the RRS would 
decrease the rate of cardiac and respiratory arrests by 50%, mortality rates by 
30% and ICU transfer rate by 15%. To detect these differences in the rates 
before and after RRS with 80% power using a two-sided alpha level, the 
numbers of patients required per period are listed in the table below. Assuming 
the average number of patients admitted in UMMMC is approximately 3600 per 
month, we had 80% power to detect the expected change in outcomes. Power 
calculations were done using only university campus data.  
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Table 3.2: Sample size and power estimation (University Campus) 
Outcome Incidence 
Before RRS 
Incidence 
After RRS Two-sided alpha 
level 
Power 
# of patients 
required in 
before period 
(12 mths) 
# of patients 
required in 
after period 
(24 mths) 
Cardiac 
arrests  
0.1% 0.04% 0.05 80% 33752 67504 
In-hospital 
deaths 
2.3% 1.7% 0.05 80% 35994 71988 
ICU transfer  2% 1.7% 0.05 80% 32333 64666 
 
Results 
Rapid Response Calls 
There were a total of 683 calls, 449 at the University Campus and 234 at 
Memorial over the two years of hospital wide implementation. The triggers were 
collected on the Event form and are included in Table 3.3. The majority of the 
calls were made because of an acute drop in oxygen saturation or “staff 
concern”. Very few calls were for possible stroke, possibly in part because a 
separate acute stroke team became available shortly after the RRS.  Increasing 
oxygen delivery and providing medications were the most common interventions 
instituted by the responding team. Transfer to the ICU continued to be the most 
common outcome of a call followed by stabilization of the patient on the floor. 
There were only a few changes of DNR/CMO status.  
The characteristics of patients were aggregated and evaluated for 
differences in the populations before and after the evaluation and displayed in 
Table 3.4. This data was provided in aggregate form and no statistical testing 
done.  
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Table 3.3: Rapid Response Triggers, Interventions, and Disposition  
 
 Campus 
Rapid Response Triggers 
(Some patients had more than 1 
trigger) 
Memorial 
(n=97) 
University 
(n=201) Total 
Acute drop in O2sat to  90% 30 (31) 82 (41) 112 
Marked nursing housestaff or family 25(26) 63(31) 88 
LOC Decreased level of 
consciousness 22(23) 56(28) 78 
Heart rate> 120 17(18) 32(16) 49 
Significant drop in O2sat from base 12(13) 26(13) 38 
Systolic BP < 90 12(13) 20(10) 32 
Seizure 11(12) 19(9) 30 
Heart rate <40 5(6) 13(6) 18 
Chest Pain 9(10) 13(6) 22 
RR  rate le 6 6(7) 8(4) 14 
Agitation/  delirium 1(2) 7(3) 8 
Fi O2  50% or O2 6 lpm 4(5) 6(3) 10 
Trigger Unknown 2(3) 4(2) 6 
Possible stroke 1(2) 2(1) 3 
Urine output low 3(4) 2(1) 5 
Interventions 
( Some patients had more than 1 
intervention) 
   
Increase Oxygen 37 (38) 101 (50) 138 
Meds 37(38) 82(41) 119 
Start Oxygen 23(24) 57(28) 80 
IV Fluid Bolus 15(16) 37(18) 52 
Nebulizer TX 12(13) 20(10) 32 
Tracheal Suction 10(11) 12(6) 22 
None 4(5) 19(9) 23 
Other 26(27) 40(20) 66 
Disposition    
Transfer to ICU 42(43) 89 (44) 131 
Immediate treatment given Trigger/s 
back to normal 32(33) 59(29) 91 
Treatment planned; reevaluate 
following treatment 18(19) 54(27) 72 
 No active treatment given or 
planned 1(2) 10(5) 11 
Change of status to DNR CMO 1(2) 3(1) 4 
Other 6(7) 28(14) 34 
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Table 3.4: Patient Demographics 
  Memorial  University 
 Pre-intervention 
Post-
interventi
 
 Pre-intervention 
Post-
intervention 
Male 12940 (40) 11281(39)  18791 (56) 19322 (55) 
Female 19770 (60) 17676 (61)  15399 (45) 16135 (45) 
<25 722 (2) 729 (3)  1656 (5) 1608 (5) 
25-34 1,582 (5) 1,685 (6)  2,397 (7) 
 
2319 (7) 
35-44 3,478 (11) 3,021 (10)  4158 (12) 4,022 (11) 
45-54 5,341 (16) 5,032 (17)  6704 (20) 6591 (19) 
55-64 5,946 (18) 5,360 (19)  6729 (20) 7249 (20) 
65-74 5,426 (17) 4,795 (17)  5279 (15) 5700 (16) 
75-84 6,211 (19) 4,995 (17)  4792 (14) 5144 (14) 
85-94 3,635 (11) 3,048 (11)  2330 (7) 2619 (7) 
95-104 368 (1) 293 (1)  145 (0.4) 
 
207 (0.6) 
 
105-114 1 (.003) 1 (.003)  0 4 (0.01) 
 
White 28,41 (86) 
 
25158 (87) 
 
 29142 (85) 
 
30,618 (86) 
Other Race 1879 (6) 
 
2111 (7) 
 
 2616 (8) 
 
2,665 (7.5) 
Black 1,256 (4) 1278 (4) 
 
 
 
 1213 (3.5) 
 
1,354 (4) 
Asian 
 
1,009 (3) 
 
69 (0.2)  537 (1.5) 
 
455 (1.2) 
 LAB ONLY 
 
274 (0.8) 
 
245 (0.8) 
 
 373 (1) 
 
69 (0.2) 
 
Unknown 110 (0.33) 
 
58 (0.2) 
 
 141 (0.4) 
 
202 (0.6) 
 
Refused 
 
 
 
61 ( 0.10) 
 
7 (0.2) 
 
 58 (0.1) 
 
 
69  (0.2) 
 Native 
Hawaiian/Pacif
ic Island 
33 (0.1) 
 
15 (0.05) 
  
37 (0.1) 
 
11 (0.03) 
 
 
American 
Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
 
 
 
14 (0.04) 
 
18 (0.06) 
  
26 (0.07) 
 
18 (0.05) 
Hispanic 25 (0.07 
 
0 (0)  31 (0.09) 
 
0 
 Blank 8 (0.02) 
 
0 (0)  16 (0.04) 
 
0 
 Number of 
Patients 32,710 28,959  34190 35461 
LOS (Mean) 3.8 3.8  5 5 
LOS Total 
days 122,734 108,464  172119 179416 
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Results for the Spline Regression are presented in the following graphs 
and tables. Hospital wide includes all events occurring on the hospital floors, in 
the ICUs and in diagnostic area; Floors only include medical surgical and 
psychiatric units but no diagnostic areas.  
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Figure 3.1 Rate of Code Calls (Floor Only) University Campus 
 
 
 
 
Initially a t-test comparing the mean rates of code calls before and after 
the Rapid Response Intervention showed a statistically significant decrease in 
the average rate of code calls. However, when a Spline Regression model was 
used to compare the slopes before and after the intervention, it showed that 
though there was a decline during the period before the intervention, after the 
slope was almost straight meaning that there was no longer a decline in code 
calls. It appears that before the intervention there was a slight decrease overtime 
in the rate of code calls and after it began to even out and become more stable.  
Table 3.5:  Rate of Code Calls (Floor Only) at University Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Co-efficient Spline 
Regression 
P-value 
 Before After  Before  After  
University 1.47 0.99 <0.0001 -0.012 0.00029 0.33 
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Figure 3.2: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (Hospital Wide) at University Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test comparing the mean rates of cardiac arrests before and 
after the intervention showed no statistically significant change. A standard linear 
regression showed with each month cardiac arrests decreased by 0.00027/1000 
patient days, demonstrating an overall decline in cardiac arrests throughout the 
study period. The test for significance of the knot showed that there was no 
significant difference so there was no need to continue testing the slopes before 
and after the intervention.   
Table 3.6: Rate of Code Calls (Hospital Wide) University Campus  
Campus Mean rate/ 1000 patient 
days 
p-value Difference between slopes 
before and after the knot 
(1.1.2009) 
 Before  After  Difference in 
slope 
p-value 
University 0.957 0.796 0.071 .0004107 0.307 
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Figure 3.3: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (Medical Surgical Floors Only) 
University Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistically significant difference 
in the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that for every increase in month the rate of cardiac arrests 
overall decreased by 0.0002/1000 patient days over the entire study period. The 
test for significance of the knot at 1/1/2009 showed that that the knot was not 
significant and no other testing was done.  
Table 3.7: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (Medical/Surgical Floors Only) University 
Campus 
Campus Mean rate/ 1000 patient 
days 
p-value Difference between slopes 
before and after the knot 
(1.1.2009) 
 Before  After  Difference in slope p-value 
University 0.421 0.291 0.08 0.0005289 0.112 
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Figure 3.4: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (ICU only) at University Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistically significant change in 
the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that there was not a significant decrease in the rate of cardiac 
arrests over the entire study period. The test for significance of the knot at 
1/1/2009 showed that that the knot was not significant and no other testing was 
done.  
Table 3.8: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (ICU Only) at University Campus 
Mean rate/ 1000 patient 
days 
Difference 
of Mean 
rates 
p-value Difference between slopes 
before and after the knot 
(1.1.2009) 
Before  After   Difference in slope p-value 
2.057 1.972  0.7605 0.0003469 0.792 
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Figure 3.5: Rate of Code Calls (Floor Only) at Memorial Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistically significant difference 
in the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that there was a slight increase of .0000125 code calls/1000 
patient days per month over the study period.  The test for significance of the 
knot at 1/1/2009 showed that that the knot was significant (p-value= 0.15) so the 
Spline regression was used with the knot at 1/1/2009. The Spline regression 
showed that there was a significant difference in the rate of code calls to the floor 
by 0.0010/1000 patient days.   
Table 3.9: Rate of Code Calls (Floor Only) at Memorial Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Co-efficient Spline 
Regression 
P-value 
 Before  After  Before  After  
University 1.132 1.147  0.9273  -0.0009249 0.0010159 0.026      
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Figure 3.6 : Rate of Cardiac Arrests (Hospital Wide) Memorial Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rate of cardiac arrests for Memorial was not normally distributed so 
instead of a t-test, a Mann-Whitney test of the median rates was done. This 
showed a significant difference in the median of cardiac arrests before and after 
the intervention.(p=0.092). Again because of not being normally distributed the 
data was transformed showing that there was a significant decrease of 0.000196 
(p=0.024) in the rate of cardiac arrests over the whole study period. Testing for 
the knot did not show a difference between the two slopes so no more testing 
was necessary.  
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Figure 3.7: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (Medical/Surgical Floors) Memorial 
Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistical significant difference 
in the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that there was a slight decrease of .0001552 code calls/1000 
patient days per month over the study period.  The test for significance of the 
knot at 1/1/2009 showed that that the knot was not significant so no more testing 
was necessary.  
Table 3.10: Rate of Cardiac Arrest (Medical/Surgical Floors Only) Memorial Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Difference between 
slopes before and after 
the knot (1.1.2009)  
P-value 
 Before  After  0.001367 0.553 
University  0.2307 0.1188  0.07 
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Figure 3.8: Rate of Cardiac Arrests (ICU Only) Memorial Campus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistically significant difference 
in the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that there were no significant differences over the study 
period.  The test for significance of the knot at 1/1/2009 showed that that the knot 
was not significant so no more testing was necessary.  
Table 3.11: Rate of Cardiac Arrest (ICU Only) Memorial Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Difference in slopes 
before and after the 
knot (1/1/2009) 
P-value 
 Before  After  Difference   
University 1.581 1.132  0.357 0.0013677 0.0553 
57 
 
 
 
10
15
20
25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ja
n 2
00
8
Ap
r 2
00
8
Ju
l 2
00
8
Oc
t 2
00
8
Ja
n 2
00
9
Ap
r 2
00
9
Ju
l 2
00
9
Oc
t 2
00
9
Ja
n 2
01
0
Ap
r 2
01
0
Ju
l 2
01
0
Oc
t 2
01
0
Ja
n 2
01
1
Date
Connected Lowess
Rate of Floor to ICU Transfers at Memorial Campus
Figure 3.9: Rate of Floor to ICU Transfers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial t-test showed that there was no statistically significant difference 
in the mean rate before and after the beginning of the intervention. The linear 
regression showed that there were no significant differences over the study 
period.  The test for significance of the knot at 1/1/2009 showed that that the knot 
was not significant so no more testing was necessary.  
 
Table 3.12: Rate of ICU Transfers from Medical/Surgical Floors Memorial Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Difference between slopes 
before and after the knot 
(1.1.2009)  
P-value 
 Before  After  0.0029 0.640 
Memorial 16.1 16.3 0.822 
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Figure 3.10: Rate of Floor to ICU Transfers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially a t-test comparing the mean rates of ICU transfers before and after 
the RRS showed a statistically significant decrease in the average rate of code 
calls. A linear regression showed that there was a decrease of 0.004388 over the 
entire 3 year study period.  However, when a Spline Regression model was used 
to compare the slopes before and after the intervention there were no significant 
differences in the slopes.  
 
Table 3.13: Rate of ICU Transfers from Medical/Surgical Floors Memorial Campus 
Campus Mean rate p-value Difference between slopes 
before and after the knot 
(1.1.2009)  
P-value 
 Before  After  0.00082 0.846 
University 14.35 11.40 <0.000 
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Discussion 
This before and after study found some changes when comparing the 
outcomes before and after the RRS intervention. The most notable were the 
code calls on the University and Memorial campuses. University campus showed 
a significant difference between the mean rates of code calls from the two study 
periods as well as an overall decrease over the entire 4 years. However, the 
Spline regression showed that the slope after the intervention did not differ 
significantly from 0 meaning that it became almost flat. This could mean that 
there was a decrease in the time period before and the intervention stopped the 
decline. A more logical explanation is that around 1 call per 1000 patient days is 
the lowest that could be expected on the floor and having the RRS in place 
helped to stabilize the rate of code calls at this low level. A similar finding was 
found at the Memorial campus, though there was a slight increase over the 4 
years and the trend seems to be climbing. The RRS is likely responding to calls 
Table 3.14: Mean Rates/ 1000 Patient Days Before and After 
the RRS Intervention 
 University Memorial 
Outcome Before  After Before After 
Code Calls on 
Floor 
1.47 0.99 1.132 1.147 
Cardiac Arrests 
Hospital Wide 
0.957 0.796 0.484 0.278 
Cardiac Arrests 
Med/Surg 
Floors Only 
0.421 0.291 0.231 0.119 
Cardiac Arrests 
ICU Only 
2.057 1.972 1.58 1.13 
Floor to ICU 
Transfer 
14.35 11.40 16.1 16.3 
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that in the past would have gone to the code team even when they were not life 
threatening events. However, there was not a corresponding decrease in cardiac 
arrests. This is still an important and relevant finding. Code teams are 
traditionally triggered for life threatening situations that require the highest level 
of care possible. In our hospitals, the code team members are critical care 
clinicians who leave the ICU’s to respond. Though difficult to measure, this may 
leave the ICU patients without adequate coverage for the amount of time needed 
for the code call. If the call is indeed for a life threatening emergency, then the 
team’s activation and absence from the ICU is the appropriate response. 
However, if the code team is being summoned for less urgent cases then the 
team is not being effectively used and may be using important resources 
unnecessarily. In this study, the reduction of code calls, without a reduction in 
cardiac arrest would indicate that the code team was not being activated properly 
and was responding to situations that are now being handled with the RRT.  
The cardiac arrest data hospital wide did not show a significant change 
from the before period although, there was a significant decline that began before 
the intervention and continued throughout the study period. Preventing cardiac 
arrests hospital wide is an ongoing improvement process for most hospitals. The 
RRS may or may not have contributed to this decline. Even though this study 
looked at two years post-implementation it may not have been sufficient time to 
find a difference.  
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The results on the medical surgical floors were similar to those hospital 
wide. Cardiac arrests declined over the entire 4 years without a significant 
difference in rate after the intervention. The RRS is a change not only in 
protocols and procedures but also a cultural change. Currently, based on the 
reason for calls and the descriptions of the patients given on the Event Record, 
the calls are coming in for patients who are well into a decline. The nurses may 
not be using the trigger criteria as their primary factor when deciding to activate 
the RRS. With more education and perhaps more effective trigger criteria there 
may be changes in the activation process that could impact the arrests on the 
floors. Additionally, though not part of this study, patients and visitors are now 
able to directly activate the RRS. Further evaluation would be necessary to 
determine if having patients and families call will change the number of calls, the 
conditions for which they call and the impact these calls have on preventing 
cardiac arrests on the floors.  
Finally, there was not a significant change in the rate of cardiac arrests in 
the ICU.  The RRS would not be expected to reduce these arrests, but does 
clarify that the RRS was not just shifting patient who were going to arrest into the 
ICU. The majority of patients with a RRS call were transferred to the ICU; it is not 
clear from the data if some of these could have been prevented with an earlier 
RRS activation. Another evaluation of floor to ICU transfers could identify if 
patient being transferred earlier in the disease process might contribute to a 
shorter length of stay and mortality rates.   
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The average rates of code calls and cardiac arrests are displayed in Table 
3.12. There were very low rates of arrests especially on the medical surgical 
floors. Compared to other RRS literature (Table 3.13) the rates of cardiac arrests 
at UMMMC were low. This could be demonstrating a floor effect with only a small 
amount of room for improvement. Perhaps evaluating the current med/surg 
cardiac arrests and determining where improvement is needed would be useful 
before initiating other improvement interventions. Additionally, because of the 
rarity of the events, it might be helpful to evaluate the individual characteristics of 
each event rather than changes in rates.  
 
Table 3.15: A Sampling of Cardiac Arrest Rates in the 
RRS Literature 
Study  Rates of Cardiac 
Arrests before 
intervention  
Rate of Cardiac 
arrests after 
intervention  
Bellomo 63 (count)  22 (count) 
Brilli 0.10/ hospital day 0.04/ hospital day 
Buist 3.77/1000 pts 
days 
2.05 /1000 pts 
days 
Dacey 7.6/1000 
discharges 
3.0/1000 
discharges 
DeVita  6.5/1000 
admissions 
5.4/1000 
admissions 
Gould  1.90/1000 
discharges 
1.01/1000 
discharges 
Jones 4.06/1000 
discharges 
1.90/1000 
discharges 
Kenward 2.6/1000 
admissions 
2.4/1000 
admissions 
Mailey  2.8% 2.4% 
Offner 4.4/1000 pt days 1.4/1000 pt days 
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 Rates of floor to ICU transfers on the University campus showed a decline 
over the entire study period (3 years) but no significant difference when 
comparing the slopes before and after the intervention. Memorial campus 
showed did not show a decline in ICU transfers at all during the study period. 
Reducing floor to ICU admissions may not be the best measure of the 
effectiveness of a RRS. Though it was not shown in this study it is possible that a 
RRS may actually increase floor to ICU transfers. If patients are being assessed 
and triaged earlier in their disease process they may have a better outcome even 
if sent to the ICU. Evaluating the severity of illness at admission to the ICU, ICU 
length of stay, and discharge status may be better measures than the rate of 
transfers from the floors.  
 Another area where the RRS may be improving quality in care is when 
end of life decision are necessary. The RRS is in a unique situation to help 
facilitate discussions and support patients and families during the decision 
process. Changes in DNR/CMO status was only recorded for 4 patients across 
both campuses, however given the limited return of the Event Records it is 
possible that this was happening more often.  
Evidence shows that July is one of the most dangerous months to be in a 
teaching hospital because this is the month when the interns and residents 
advance and less experienced house staff become responsible for patient care. 
Because the RRS at UMMMC includes a hospital clinician and house staff are 
able to activate the system it essentially served as a bridge during this time 
64 
 
 
 
period. Future studies could look at the difference that the RRS has made during 
multiple years. Additionally the RRS also serves as another method to provide 
teachable moments to the brand new house staff.  
Study Limitations 
There were several limitations to this study. The most prominent is the 
difficulty in obtaining the required hospital data over a period of several years. 
The methods and quality of documentation changed during the study period with 
implementation of a new billing and medical record software as well as multiple 
staff changes. For example, the Event Record was changed to an electronic 
billing system from which information was difficult to obtain. The verification of 
cardiac arrests required cross-referencing ICD 9 discharge codes with electronic 
progress notes to determine the actual occurrence of an arrest and the location 
and outcome of the arrest.  The clinician documentation for a arrest, ICU transfer 
and activation of the RRS was minimal in terms of the detail of the cardiac 
events, the clinicians thoughts about the patient’s condition and the treatment 
plan which made abstracting information for analysis difficult.  
Though not as strong a study design as a randomized controlled trial, 
before and after, single site studies are the most feasible and acceptable 
alternative for evaluating the effectiveness of a RRS intervention. Accounting for 
the change in patient case mix over time and for changes in quality improvement 
programs, staffing, patient care policies and protocols, and diagnostic and 
treatment technologies are serious challenges inherent in this study design that 
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few if any published RRS effectiveness studies have effectively addressed.  
These were also challenges for this study. There was limited patient level data 
available and the information provided was already in aggregate form and was 
not able to be included in the statistical model. There were no known other 
interventions that could have impacted the changes, but not all interventions or 
initiatives were known to the investigators. Changes in any one of these factors 
from the pre to post-intervention period could have an independent effect on the 
outcomes being measured in an RRS study.   
Conclusion 
 Similar to other studies in the literature the results of this study were 
inconclusive in terms of outcome related to the RRS implementation. This serves 
as further evidence that the methods and outcomes used to study RRS may not 
be the most effective. This study attempted to establish standard definitions and 
measures in the evaluation of the RRS. This was not always possible given that 
much of the needed data were not available. Further research should explore not 
only better methods for studying RRS but better overall methods for evaluating 
hospital based quality improvement interventions.  
 
Proposed Ideal Study of the Effectiveness of a Rapid Response System 
 
Introduction 
The study of the effectiveness of a Rapid Response System that is reported on in 
this dissertation demonstrated some of the many difficulties in implementing and 
66 
 
 
 
evaluating hospital quality improvement interventions.  Two primary problems 
negatively impacted the evaluation at UMass Memorial Medical Center:  the lack 
of identification of problems that the RRS was being designed to improve and the 
availability of data that accurately depicted these problems. The directive by the 
Joint Commission to implement a RRS by January 2008 and a lack of resources 
to do a series of quick, retrospective studies made this impossible to accomplish.  
The following is a description of how to ideally develop and evaluate an RRS 
intervention using Statistical Process Control as an analytic tool and a process 
evaluation.  
Background: Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
W. Edwards Deming in 1975 described two types of statistics based on the 
reason for doing a study.52  The first and most commonly used in research is 
enumerative statistics. According to Deming the focus of an enumerative study is 
the action that will be taken on the sampled population. The second, an analytic 
study is one in which the action to be taken is on the process that created the 
results with the goal to improve outcomes. The purpose of a statistical study 
whether to improve a process or to judge an outcome determines the type of 
analysis that should be done.   
Statistical Process Control is an analytic tool originally designed for use in 
manufacturing settings to reduce defects, increase productivity and reduce costs 
in the manufacturing process. The objective of SPC is to improve the process 
that is producing the outcomes.  SPC use in healthcare is growing in popularity 
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due in part to its relative ease of use and interpretability. The primary tool used in 
SPC is the Control Chart or Shewhart Charts. This method based in statistical 
theory, plots data points on a chart that includes a center line (drawn at the 
mean) upper and lower control limits.  These control limits define the central 
tendency and the range of natural variation of plotted values assuming that the 
process that produced those values has remained unchanged.  The upper and 
lower control limits are statistically computed based on the probability of the 
distribution i.e., normal, binomial or Poisson.  Control chart software will compute 
the control limits that coincide with plus or minus 3 standard deviations from the 
mean of the distribution.53  Though they may appear similar it is important to 
understand that the upper and lower control limits are not the same as 
Confidence Interval limits.   
The type of control chart that is used is based on the type of data that is being 
plotted. (Table 3.16) 
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3.16 Criteria for Choosing the Correct Control Chart53  
Xbar-R  Continuous 
data 
More than 1 
observation per 
subgroup 
Less than 10 
observations per 
subgroup* 
Xbar-S  Continuous 
data 
More than 1 
observation per 
subgroup 
Not less than 10 
observation per 
subgroup 
XmR  Continuous 
data 
 Not More than 1 
observation per 
subgroup 
N/A 
C Chart  Discrete Data Both occurrences 
and non occurrences 
cannot be counted 
Equal areas of  
opportunities exist 
 
u-chart Discrete Data Both occurrences 
and non occurrences 
cannot be counted 
Equal areas of 
opportunities do not 
exist 
p-chart Discrete Data Both occurrences 
and non occurrences 
can  be counted 
Subgroups are not 
equal size 
Np-chart Discrete Data  Both occurrences 
and non occurrences 
can  be counted 
Subgroups are 
equal size 
 
* Subgroup is a sample of data pulled from a larger group 
** For example: counting the number of cardiac arrests that did occur one cannot 
count the number of cardiac arrests that did not occur 
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The variation in a process can be used to predict the amount of 
improvement possible.   A stable process implies that the variation and central 
tendency in outcomes will remain predictable within statistically controlled limits 
unless a fundamental change is made to the factors that control the process.  A 
process that is stable does not mean that there is no need for improvement; it 
means the process is consistently producing the outcome.53 For example, within 
a hospital system, the current process may be producing a consistent number of 
cardiac arrests outside of the ICU but that number may be able to be improved 
by changes in the process. 
Healthcare quality improvement studies typically occur in settings that do 
not lend themselves to strong experimental study designs. Patients and hospitals 
cannot always be randomized into receiving or not receiving the RRS 
intervention ethically or practically.  Traditional before and after study designs 
either compare aggregated data during two time points or require many months 
or years of data collection to determine changes that may be associated with the 
RRS intervention.  The Plan, Do, Study, Act  (PDSA) is a method used to 
implement, review and revise quality improvement interventions often using SPC 
as the “study” part of the cycle. (Figure 3.11)  
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The goal of SPC in the PDSA cycle is not just to 
determine if a change occurred but if that change was 
an improvement and what changes in the process 
were responsible for those changes, or what areas 
need to be revised to produce more change. This 
would be in the study part of the cycle; areas of 
necessary changes would be identified by using SPC (Act). Those changes 
would be put into action (Plan and Do), and once again SPC would be used to 
evaluate if the change was an improvement. This cycle would continue until the 
process is producing the desired outcomes.  
SPC is considered a time series analysis; although it does not aggregate 
data to compare whether there was a statistically significant difference from one 
period of time to another. Other time series analyses like Spline Regression 
compare changes in the slopes between two time periods before and after the 
intervention. The Spline Regression Model does not take into account the 
different types of variation and therefore does not contribute to understanding 
what areas of the process need improving.   
Proposed Study Design 
There are several steps that need to happen before designing an RRS 
intervention. The first step would be to identify areas that are in need of 
improvement. To decide which areas the RRS should address, representatives of 
each department associated with inpatient adult care would be brought together, 
Figure 3.11 PDSA Cycle54 
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either in focus groups or individual meetings, to target outcomes for 
improvement. For the RRS, the following departments and groups would be 
important hospital medicine, nursing, nurses’ aides and assistants, hospital 
residents, ICU clinical staff and members of the code team.  
Collecting data in a hospital system is complicated by the use of clinical 
systems that were not originally designed for aggregate population level data. 
However, when data collection is considered a priority with the burden and the 
benefits being shared among departments, accurate and useful information can 
be gathered. Discussions with interested parties will have the best chance of 
identifying accurate and useful measures, as those described in table 3.17.  
These are the recommended outcomes and measures based on observations 
of the RRS at UMass. Please note that there is currently no Code Team log at 
UMass and information from the EICU records is limited.  
For RR calls, cardiac arrests, code calls and floor to ICU transfers rates would 
be determined and plotted on a control chart on a monthly basis to insure that 
enough data points are available. Hospital and ICU length of stay and APACHE 
scores would be plotted as a monthly average. The other outcomes, reasons for 
code RRS calls and ICU transfers would necessitate a more qualitative analysis. 
Data would be separated by themes and changes in those themes would be 
documented overtime. Staff satisfaction scores would be calculated annually and 
compared to previous years.  
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Table 3.17 Proposed Outcomes for the Evaluation of a Rapid Response System 
 
Outcome Definition Measure Data source (analysis ) 
RR Calls Rate of Rapid  
Response (rates by   
month 
The number of calls received 
telecommunications 
Rapid Response Event 
forms and 
telecommunication records 
(SPC) 
Cardiac Arrests 
(floors only, ICU 
only, Hospital 
wide 
Any Cardiac or 
respiratory which 
required CPR, ACLS 
was considered as 
well as all asystole 
or PEA (rate by 
month) 
 Cardiac or Respiratory arrests 
that occur outside of the ED, 
OR, ICU or diagnostic areas. 
 
Code team log and form 
cross referenced with 
medical record review 
(SPC) 
Code Calls Number of code calls 
to floors only (rate by 
month) 
Code calls received by 
telecommunications that 
originate from the floors 
Code team log and 
telecommunications records 
(SPC) 
Reason for code 
call 
Reason for code 
calls (categorized) 
The documented reason for 
code calls ( cardiac, non-
cardiac) 
Code team log (qualitative 
analysis) 
Floor to ICU 
transfers 
Transfers to the ICU 
that do not originate 
in the OR, ED (rate 
per month) 
Rate of floor to ICU transfers EICU data (SPC) 
Reason for ICU 
transfers 
Reason for transfers 
that do not originate 
from OR or Ed 
(categorized) 
Reasons for ICU categorized EICU admission record 
(qualitative analysis)  
LOS Hospital/ICU Number of days in 
the ICU(rate  by 
month) 
Average number of days in the 
ICU by month 
EICU records, medical 
records (SPC)  
ICU APACHE 
Scores 
Severity score 
assigned to patients 
at ICU admission 
(average score by 
month) 
Average score by month EICU records (SPC) 
Clinical Staff 
Satisfaction 
Clinical staff 
satisfaction with the 
intervention and 
overall satisfaction 
(quantifiable change 
in satisfaction 
scores)  
Changes in survey results Individual surveys given to 
staff before and after the 
intervention (SPC and 
qualitative) 
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Analysis: Statistical Process Control 
       Individual control charts will be used to plot the rates of all the outcomes.  
Data will be prospectively collected on patients who are admitted to the hospital 
and are over the age of 18, the study should begin with months before the 
intervention and continue through the months and years after the intervention 
with continuous monitoring and changes in the process made as necessary. 
Most of the data collected will likely be rates with a Poisson distribution so a U-
Chart will be used. Statistical control will be determined using the retrospective 
data to determine a baseline for the process.  
A process that does not show baseline stability may be demonstrating 
special causes that are influencing the outcome of the process. These special 
causes may need to be addressed within the current process before changes are 
made to the overall process. For example, if cardiac arrests are happening on 
the floor at a higher rate (outside of the control limits) in one particular month 
indicating a special cause it would be important to determine the cause before 
going forward with a different intervention.55 
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Figure 3.12: Sample of the Control Chart Using Partial Data from the 
Previous Study 
 
 
Figure 3.12 shows a sample control chart using partial data from the thesis study 
and was created using QI Macros. The software set the control limits. The data 
from the time before the intervention suggests that the process was within control 
limits and although there was one point right on the upper control limit line, it was 
still considered in control. January 2009 was the month of the full implementation 
of the intervention. At that time the rates of code calls fell to 0; which was 
probably due to a brief confusion about when to call the RRS as opposed to the 
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code team. Following that month there was an obvious drop in the rate of code 
calls. The center line (mean rate) actually shifts dramatically following the 
intervention. This implies that the intervention actually changed the code call 
process with a resulting significant drop in the overall rate of calls. If used as part 
of the PDSA cycle, this chart would show that not only that there was a shift in 
the mean but the amount of variation in the process appears to also have been 
reduced. When additional information relating to any changes of the reasons for 
code calls is combined with these results, it could suggest that the RRS has 
reduced the number of code calls that were not life threatening.  
Discussion of Strengths and Weaknesses of SPC  
When the goal of the study is to improve the process of delivering 
healthcare, SPC allows for fast interpretation that can be used to revise and 
improve the intervention.  SPC can be used to estimate the outcome of the 
process by using a sample of the population or when possible the entire 
population can be used.  SPC is not designed to be a onetime analysis of an 
intervention. Ideally it is used as an ongoing evaluation of the process which is 
modified when special cause variation occurs. When this is consistently being 
tracked during real time the intervention becomes a dynamic process as opposed 
to a one time intervention with effectiveness being determined months or years 
later. However, for this to work properly, data has to be easily available on a 
regular basis.  This was not possible during the evaluation period of the RRS at 
UMass.  When systems are set up to track and document data in an SPC format 
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then more frequent monitoring can occur with timely changes to the process 
being made. This approach does not allow a more typical before and after or time 
series analysis to be done since the intervention or process is being changed as 
time goes by.  
In the beginning, there might be some confusion in the use of SPC to 
evaluate and improve a process. A process “in control” does not necessarily 
mean that the outcome is the desired outcome. An in control process implies that 
the process is producing what it is designed to produce. If that is not a desired 
outcome, the process still needs to be improved. With consistent monitoring, 
SPC can quickly identify when a process becomes out of control and can 
pinpoint a specific time when this happens, so that users can analyze the cause 
of the variation and change the process. SPC is easily interpretable with minimal 
education of staff so that it can be used by clinical staff in real time with only 
minimal statistician support.  Therefore, more quality improvement projects can 
be conducted quickly and accurately.   
A systematic review of published studies done in the healthcare field that 
used SPC in their analysis found that SPC:56  
1. helped people to assess the impact of changes to the process 
2. contributed to improvement of healthcare processes 
3. helped people identify areas for improvement 
4. helped people distinguish special from common cause 
5. enabled valuable prediction of future process performance 
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6. helped describe and quantify process variability 
7. improved communication between process actors 
8. enabled better informed decision making 
9. empowered process stakeholders 
10. helped stakeholders learn about their processes 
Additionally the studies reported some negatives with the use of SPC which 
included:  
1. sharing  the performance data in control chart format did not automatically 
lead to improvement in healthcare organizations 
2. statistical control did not necessarily equal clinical control or desired 
performance 
3. cause and effect relationships are not always obvious, even if a change is 
identified with statistical confidence 
4. Stakeholders have differences in their ability to apply SPC correctly  
Perhaps one of the most important items that came from the systematic 
reviews was documented limitations regarding data for use in control charts. 
These included factors about the data that makes using SPC less effective. The 
most common types of control charts are not well suited to analysis of infrequent 
or rare events. Other data concerns relate to the collection of the data itself, 
including: 
a. difficulties in collecting data that could not be automated (paper 
medical records) 
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b. long sampling periods delayed use of the charts to continuously 
improve processes  
c. control chart interpretation was difficult if charts were not annotated 
with interventions or other influences on process performance 
Traditional practices and system culture may also create difficulties in 
introducing and using SPC effectively. The following difficulties were reported in 
terms of changing how interventions and other processes were evaluated: 
1. limited  knowledge on how to apply SPC correctly, extensive education of 
staff required 
2. SPC not seen as helpful or an improvement over other evaluation systems 
in place 
3. finding the right level of aggregation of data for SPC application can be 
difficult and require trade-offs 
4. data collection can be time consuming and costly  
5. determining the probability distribution is difficult for staff not familiar with 
the concept 
6. lack of access to reliable data in a timely fashion can be a barrier to real-
time SPC application  
7. lack of computer power was a barrier to real time SPC application 
Another downside of using SPC is that it does not lend itself to cross-
institutional summaries. Because of SPC’s dependence on the variation within a 
specific process, hospitals with different processes produce differing variation.  
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Recommendations for future studies of quality improvement projects 
Studies done in hospitals are difficult to combine in meta analyses 
because of the differences in settings, patient populations and interventions. 
There is value in replicating and combining research from single sites in order to 
determine best practices; however, published studies in healthcare quality 
improvement might be more useful if the focus is on implementation strategies 
and methods of evaluating of the intervention.  Improving processes in 
healthcare serves a different function than finding the most effective clinical 
treatment or even understanding the epidemiology of specific disease processes. 
Each hospital is going to have different strengths and weaknesses depending on 
their clinicians, other staff and patient populations. SPC and the PDSA cycle 
provide tools to evaluate the process in a way that is easy to use and interpret 
allowing for faster improvements to the process. Publicizing of the use of these 
tools will provide important information to guide other organizations in their use. 
The goal of this type of research is to evaluate and record the impact that the 
different iterations of an intervention have on the outcomes.  
     Cardiac arrests on the floor sometimes have antecedents before the arrest 
but sometimes do not. This is an essential part in determining if the RRS actually 
reduced the number of preventable cardiac arrests on the floor as well as the 
number of preventable ICU admissions. A better outcome measure would be the 
number of preventable cardiac arrests and ICU admissions. Both these 
measures would need to be defined by a set of pre-determined antecedents that 
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would be documented in the medical records. This could be complemented by 
interviewing the patient’s care team soon after the event.  
Process Evaluation  
      It is important in quality improvement research to not only understand if the 
intervention improved outcomes but whether it worked as it was designed and 
how the process improved outcomes. The process evaluation of the RRS should 
have started with a survey of clinical staff and patients about the methods being 
used to contact and get help at a patient’s bedside. This would not only have 
provided a baseline to evaluate the intervention but the identified gaps would 
also have guided the development of the RRS.  Anecdotally, there were many 
official and unofficial ways for bedside nurses to get help. These depended 
largely on the ability of the bedside nurse to understand and communicate the 
urgency of the situation to the house officers. 
A process evaluation can also determine if the intervention responded to all the 
patients who needed a RRS and did not receive it; but it is necessary to identify 
those patients. Transfer from the floor to the ICU and cardiac arrests on the floor 
are two strong indicators that a patient’s condition has had an acute clinical 
decline while on a general floor. Identifying these patients and evaluating each 
medical record for triggers that would have activated the system could give an 
approximate number of patients who were missed by the RRS. Sometimes 
improving one area can create unexpected negative outcomes in other areas. It 
is important to evaluate unintended outcomes of the RRS which might include:  
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 delay in activating the code team 
 bedside nurse spending too much time with the RRS patient and 
less time with other patients 
 patients being treated on the floor longer than optimal.  
 too many unnecessary calls 
 increase in ICU transfers without an adequate number of beds 
available 
      The high time cost, energy and money  of quality improvement projects 
makes it important to understand where an intervention is needed, what needs to 
be changed and how the improvement team will determine that a change has 
produced improvements. The first step in doing both a quantitative and 
qualitative study is to identify the areas that need improving by involving all 
stakeholders. Once a baseline is established an intervention is designed with 
continuous tracking of outcomes. Monitoring of the data being collected allows 
adjustments and changes as needed. Following these steps with a process 
evaluation provides the best use of resources to improve the quality of healthcare 
being provided.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Modified Process Evaluation of a Rapid Response Team 
 
Introduction 
Rapid Response Systems (RRS) have been implemented in many 
hospitals in the United States and other countries with the goal of bringing a 
higher level of care to the bedside of a patient experiencing a clinical decline 
outside of the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The thought is that bringing a care team 
with critical care skills to the patient will improve certain outcomes such as 
cardiac arrests outside of the ICUs and reduce the frequency of transfers to the 
ICU from the floor. Systematic reviews have shown that the evidence for the 
effectiveness for  RRS is mixed.13-17 The authors of reviews and meta analyses 
have cited poor study design, flawed data analysis, and heterogeneity in 
implementation, team members and outcome measures as reasons for the lack 
of clear evidence to support the intervention. The Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement encourages systems thinking to facilitate performance 
improvement by stating that “Every system is perfectly designed to achieve 
exactly the results it gets”.57  If the outcomes of RRS implementation are not 
what was hoped for or expected, it becomes important to look at the RRS from a 
different prospective, to evaluate the process in addition to the final outcomes. 
While studies aimed at evaluating intervention effectiveness focus on outcomes, 
process evaluation determines if the intervention was implemented and used as 
it was designed to be used.58 
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There have been some studies that attempted to look beyond the clinical 
outcomes of a RRS. They assessed the attitudes and experiences of bedside 
nurses who are the most frequent users of the RRS. Three studies, report the 
results of surveys of hospital staff aimed at assessing usage and perceptions of a 
RRS.60,61,62 A study from Australia, with a sample size of 73 nurses, found that 
the more experienced the nurse the more likely he/she was to use the RRS.59 
The nurses’ suggested that improvements of the RRS should focus on additional 
education for nurses and team members and on working with team members to 
help them be more positive and supportive when responding to a call. In another 
Australian study investigators developed a survey and administered it to a 
sample of 351 nurses.60 They found that nurses were more likely to call the 
covering provider before calling the RRT even though the protocol was to call the 
RRT first. The authors also found that nurses may be underestimating the 
significance of the trigger signs and often opting not to call the RRT when trigger 
signs are present. The nurses in the study felt that the RRS prevented cardiac 
arrest and helped them to manage unwell patients. However, some of the nurses 
were hesitant to call fearing criticism of their ability to care for their patients. 
Nineteen percent of the responders felt that RRS calls were required because 
medical management by the doctors, especially junior doctors, was thought to be 
inadequate. Eighty-one percent of the nurses indicated that they would call if they 
were unable to contact the covering physician and 56% said they would call if 
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they were concerned about their patient even if the vital signs were normal.  
Investigators in Canada using the same survey (n=275) found similar results.62 
 A study that used 50 semi-structured individual interviews of nurses in 6 
California hospitals found that the nurses use a combination of the specified 
triggers and their own knowledge to decide when to activate the RRS for patients 
who did not meet the criteria.62 The authors also found that newer nurses were 
more likely to consult with a more experienced nurse before calling even when 
this was not part of the protocol.  
Two other studies observed that the number and rate of calls to the RRS 
team increase over time.39,63 This may explain some of the differences in 
outcomes across published studies. As the primary nurses become more 
comfortable and confident in the system, the number of calls to the team may 
increase, this may have an effect on the outcomes. Additionally, the reaction of 
the responding clinicians, whether positive or negative, is will impact RRS usage. 
(Figure 4.1) 
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Model of Nurses’ Usage of the RRS 
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An evaluation of the effectiveness of an intervention is not enough. A 
process evaluation will determine the extent to which the intervention functioned 
as it was designed. There are several domains in a process evaluation: context, 
reach, dose delivered, dose received, fidelity, implementation and recruitment.58 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the development and implementation of 
a RRS at two academic hospitals as well as a modified process evaluation 
looking at the following domains: reach, dose delivered and fidelity. Also included 
is an evaluation of nursing and other staff perspectives of and attitudes towards 
the RRS.  
Implementing a Rapid Response System 
The UMMMC Office of Quality and Patient Safety convened a working 
group with representation from medical and surgical subspecialties, nursing, 
respiratory therapy, hospital medicine, and critical care. After a thorough review 
of the literature and discussion of several models for the RRS, this group 
reached agreement on objectives, a model and eleven clinical triggers to guide 
activation.  
The objectives for the Rapid Response System were: 
 To identify, diagnose and immediately treat hospitalized patients outside 
of the ICU at the first sign of serious clinical decline 
 To prevent code calls and urgent, unexpected transfers to the ICU and to 
reduce overall hospital mortality 
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The initial RRS model included a dedicated critical care nurse as the key RRS 
responder. This person could be called for informal consults without activation of 
the system. A hospital medicine staff physician was the clinical lead and the first-
call house officer for the patient was included on the team. A 2 week pilot study 
on two floors at each hospital revealed that nurses rarely formally activated the 
system, but frequently sought the advice of the critical care nurse in managing 
acute problems. This model was well received by the floor nurses and staff, but 
the limited resources of the institution made it impossible to support the 
expansion of the critical care nursing staff.  The work group also received input 
from hospital medicine that their staff physicians were reluctant to commit to 
serve as clinical lead because of competing time and service demands. Some 
residency program directors also advocated for house officers to be designated 
as clinical leaders of the Rapid Response team as they would have specific case 
knowledge of the patient and would also benefit educationally from the 
experience. As a result, the work group identified an alternative model that was 
financially feasible and responsive to the concerns expressed about the first 
model.  
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Revised Model 
The hospital medicine service had recently begun a program of hiring nurse 
practitioners (NP) and physician assistants (PA) trained in acute care medicine to 
support the work of staff hospitalists. After discussion on a variety of models, the 
work group decided that the NPs and PAs had the skills to respond to the acute  
clinical issues faced by a Rapid Response team and that their collective 
enthusiasm for the program made them good candidates to take on the role that 
the critical care nurses had in the original model. The NPs and PAs also have 
access to supervision and back-up by the in-house hospital medicine physicians 
(hospitalists). Rapid Response Team members and roles and protocols for the 
revised model are described in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Established Roles and Protocols for Rapid Response Team 
Team Member  Role  Protocol 
Bedside Nurse  To activate the RRS and 
to have all necessary 
patient information ready 
for team 
To use pre-determined 
criteria to activate team; 
use SBAR to 
communicate with team 
Hospital Medicine NP/PA 
or Hospitalist 
To offer clinical support; 
responsible for all 
documentation 
associated with RRS  
Arrive within 5 minutes of 
call 
Complete Rapid 
Response Record 
House Officer Clinical Lead Arrive within 5 minutes of 
call 
Nursing Supervisor  Nursing support and 
resource management 
Arrive within 5 minutes of 
call (nights and 
weekends only) 
Respiratory Therapist  Maintain Airway  Arrive within 5 minutes of 
call 
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When the primary nurse calls the Rapid Response number (a dedicated line) 
the operator activates a system that simultaneously alpha pages required team 
members.  The covering house officer receives a page and is required to call 
telecommunications to acknowledge receipt, and to receive the location of the 
patient.  
Educational and promotional efforts 
Nursing brochures, pocket cards and pens developed in-house were 
distributed during educational sessions that were conducted on every unit, every 
shift, targeting floor nurses, medical assistants, patient care assistants, and ward 
secretaries. Posters were developed that included activation triggers and the 
RRS process and were left at each nursing station after they were used in 
training sessions. This was an efficient way to reach the most nurses with the 
least amount of disruption of their duties.  All of the educational materials 
included the trigger criteria and specific situations when the RRS would not be 
appropriate to activate.  
Hospital medicine clinicians and house staff received role-specific training. 
Other staff members including attending medical staff and respiratory therapists 
were informed of the intervention by a combination of in-person trainings, emails, 
messages on screen savers and paychecks, and information in an organizational 
newsletter. These were venues already developed for the dissemination of new 
information and did not require additional funds. The implementation group was 
responsible for the education during the pilot and nursing educators provided 
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“Just in Time” education before full implementation. The educational sessions 
occurred over a 2 week period, 20 minutes per session at minimal cost.  
Methods 
A  modified process evaluation was conducted evaluating fidelity, reach, 
dose delivered, and staff perspectives of the RRS.58 Table 4.2 describes in detail 
the domains being assessed, the questions answered for each domain, the 
targeted populations and the measures and data sources. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Modified Process Evaluation Domains58 
Domain Research Question Target of 
Evaluation 
Measures/Data 
Source 
Fidelity/ Nurse and staff 
performance: Nurse and RRT 
member performance  
 Are the RRS protocols 
being followed? 
 % of staff that arrived in 
5-10 minutes 
 %  use of SBAR of the 
nurses 
 Primary 
Nurse 
2  Rapid 
Response 
Team  
Rapid 
Response 
Event Forms 
Reach: The proportion of the 
intended target that is reached 
by the Rapid Response Team.  
 What % of patients who 
are eligible for RRS 
receive it?  
  
 Does this differ by 
patient characteristics 
(age, gender, and 
acuity), shift, floor or 
unit, or Hospital?  
Patients Medical records 
Meditech 
Visicu 
Dose delivered: The number of 
calls that are made to and 
responded to by the Rapid 
Response System.  
 How many calls were 
made? 
 Does this differ 
overtime, by shift or 
hospital?  
 
Primary 
nurses 
Rapid 
Response 
Event Forms 
Tele-
communications 
Record 
Perspective of Staff affected   What is the 
acceptability/satisfactio
n? 
What are the barriers to 
RRS use? 
Primary 
nurses 
Focus groups 
Surveys 
(individuals) 
91 
 
 
 
Fidelity 
The fidelity of the intervention was assessed based on the extent that the staff, 
primary nurses and team members followed the protocols established for them. 
The protocols for the primary nurse and other clinical staff included identifying an 
established trigger and activating the Rapid Response Team (RRT). Triggers and 
four situations which should not trigger a RRS are described in Table 4.3. 
Additionally, they were to communicate the Situation, Background, Assessment 
and Recommendations using the SBAR format shown in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 
Rapid Response Triggers  
All Triggers refer to NEW ONSET of the Condition 
There are 4 situations in which a Trigger usually does 
not require action: 
 
1. Baseline condition: The patient has the Trigger as a 
baseline condition normal for the patient (e.g. a 
patient with CHF on multiple medications with systolic 
BP of 88 and no symptoms) 
  
2. Treatment underway: The Trigger has been 
documented on previous recent assessments AND 
the responsible clinicians have already addressed 
the Trigger 
 
3. Expected finding: The Trigger has been 
documented on recent assessments and is an 
EXPECTED finding for the clinical circumstances (e.g. 
expected drowsiness while recovering from conscious 
sedation) 
 
4. Patient not a candidate for Rapid Response: 
patients who are CMO will usually not benefit from 
Rapid Response because life-saving treatments are 
not indicated. (Most DNR patients ARE candidates for 
Rapid Response) 
 
 Nursing, LIP or family has a marked concern about 
the patient 
 Heart rate  < 40 or >120  
 Systolic BP < 90 
 Chest pain unresponsive to initial treatments and 
NTG  
 Respiratory rate <6 or >30  
 O2 saturation <90% or significant drop from baseline      
      - despite delivered oxygen  
 >= 50% O2 by mask or >= 6 liters per min 
 Acute change in mental status 
 New onset seizure 
 Possible stroke 
 Urine output <50 ml. over 4 hours  
      (<120 ml over 4 hours for patients 48 hrs or less post-
op) 
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The protocols for the Rapid Response Team include, arriving within 5 
minutes of the call, evaluating the patient, initiating a treatment plan and when 
able to transfer care back to the care team or to the ICU.  A Rapid Response 
Event form was filled out by the responding Rapid Response Hospital Medicine 
Clinician and includes information about the event that triggered the call as well 
as the interventions that followed the calls. This information was compared to the 
written protocols developed for this intervention to assess how often the process 
varied from those protocols. 
Reach 
The RRS is designed with the intention of reaching all medical/surgical 
patients whose conditions are acutely deteriorating. All patients who have a 
cardiopulmonary arrest on the medical/surgical floors or who were transferred 
from the floor to the ICU without an RRS intervention were identified using 
Table 4.4   SBAR 
1. 
Situation 
 "I called a Rapid response 
because: " 
 "I am concerned about:" 
 "The current VS and mental 
status are:" 
 
2. 
Background 
 Important medical/surgical 
history:   
 Recent procedure(s): 
 Recent significant labs:  
 Pertinent allergies/meds 
2. 
Assessment 
 “Some possible problems that 
concern me are:" 
4. 
Recommendation 
 "I would like the patient 
evaluated for:" 
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telecommunication records,  ICD 9 discharge codes, an electronic database and 
the Rapid Response Event Record. These patients represent those who may 
have met the RRS criteria but did not receive a team intervention. The frequency 
of these occurrences was recorded monthly to assess changes over time. 
Dose Delivered 
Using the Rapid Response Event Records and tele-communication 
Records we determined the incidence of calls per 1000 patient days by month, 
and assessed whether those calls increased or decreased over time. These 
results were compared other published reports to determine if the usage of the 
RRS is what would have been expected.  
Staff Perspective 
The attitudes, knowledge and behaviors of primary nurses are key to the 
frequency and appropriateness of RRS calls. Nursing behavior is the most 
important proximal factor related to reach and dose delivered because nurses 
initiate almost all rapid response calls. Figure 4.1 shows how the attitudes and 
perspectives of the nurses can be impacted by the response they receive from 
the responding RRT and the patients care team. This could impact the usage of 
the RRS. To evaluate nurses’ satisfaction and barriers to using the RRS, a focus 
group and a survey were developed.  The information provided during the focus 
group was transcribed and analyzed for reoccurring themes. The outcomes of 
the focus groups also informed the development of additional questions for a 
survey based on one used in two prior studies.60,61  The survey was administered 
94 
 
 
 
by the nursing supervisors under the direction of the Office of Quality to all 
nurses who work in the hospital areas covered by the RRS. This survey 
measured satisfaction, perceived barriers and perceived usefulness of the RRS. 
Both nurses who have activated the RRS and those who have not were included. 
Excluded were any per-diem nurses, and those who worked exclusively in areas 
not covered by the RRS. 
Results 
 
Fidelity 
Fidelity of the intervention was primarily evaluated using the Rapid 
Response Event Records that collected information regarding the response time 
of the team, the reporting of the event by the bedside nurse and the 
appropriateness of the call. The responding hospital medicine Clinicians were 
responsible for filling out the Event Form. Out of a total of 683, only 338 Event 
Records were completed: 202 from University (return rate of 45 %) and 98 from 
Memorial (a return rate of 42%). The remaining 38 had campus or location 
missing so it is unclear where these were from and they could not be used in any 
analysis that required separation by campus. There are several reasons that may 
explain the low return of the event forms. First, they were hard copies only so 
that it required that they be available when needed, and that once filled out they 
be returned to the pickup location. Second, the importance of the forms may not 
have been clear to the staff filling them out. If the call resulted in no formal 
intervention, it was not seen as a priority, or when the event occurred during a 
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busy day, the forms may have been forgotten. There were no obvious differences 
based on the time, date or day of the call. During the second year of the 
intervention, there was a change on the University campus in that NPs and PAs 
were no longer covering during the day time shifts. The RRS pager was then 
given to the hospitalist. This resulted in a lower than average return of the forms. 
The following tables summarize the information reported in the forms that were 
returned.  
 
 
 
Table 4.6:  Response Time of the Rapid Response Team (Memorial) 
Team Member <=5 
min 
(%) 
5-10 
min 
10-15 >15 No 
show 
Not 
sure 
Missing  
House Officer 55(56) 6 (6) 3(3) 2 (2) 3(3) 0 29 (30) 
Hospital Medicine 
Clinician 
74 (76) 9 (10) 0 0 0 0 15 (15) 
Respiratory 
Therapist 
77 (79) 3 (3)  0 0 1 (1) 0 17 (18) 
Bedside Nurse 79 (81) 0 0 0 0 1(1) 18 (18) 
Nursing 
Supervisor 
58 (59) 5 (5) 1(1) 1(1) 0 4 (4) 29 (30) 
Table 4.5: Response Time of the Rapid Response Team (University) 
Team Member <=5 min 5-10 
min 
10-15 >15 No 
show 
Not 
sure 
Missing  
House Officer 122 (60) 23 (11) 3 (2) 6 (3) 7 (3) 4 (2) 37 (18) 
Hospital Medicine 
Clinician 
169 (84) 9 (4.5) 1 (.5) 0(.5) 1(.5) 0 21 (10) 
Respiratory 
Therapist 
147 (73) 9 (4.5) 1(.5) 1(.5) 1(.5) 5 (2) 38 (19) 
Bedside Nurse 172 (85) 1(.5) 0 0 1(.5) 1(.5) 27(13.5) 
Nursing 
Supervisor 
101 (50) 12 (6) 3 
(1.5) 
3 (1.5) 12 (6) 10 (5) 61(30) 
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The responding HO was considered the clinical lead for the Rapid 
Response Team.  Table 4.7 includes the response given by the hospital 
medicine clinicians as to the effectiveness of the HO interaction. This was not 
specified in any of the educational material and was collected to be able to 
determine if the interaction with HO might have an impact on the usage of the 
RRS.  
    
Table 4.7: Effectiveness of the House Officer Response 
 
Not 
Effective 
1 
2 
Somewhat 
Effective 
3 
4 
Very 
Effective 
5 
Missing 
University 6 (3) 11 (5.5) 17 (8.5) 37 (18) 84 (42) 47 (23) 
Memorial 0 1(1) 8 (8) 15 (15) 43 (44) 30 (32) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Nurses use of SBAR 
 University Memorial 
 
 Incomplete Somewhat 
complete 
Complet
e 
Incomplet
e 
Somewhat 
complete 
Complete 
Situation 17 68 101 3 38 41 
Background 21 77 77 5 36 39 
Assessment 14 62 101 7 32 40 
 Yes No   Yes No 
Recommendatio
n 
119 63   60 22 
Missing 234   449   
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The beside nurses’ protocol included providing information to the other 
team members using the SBAR format. This format was designed to encourage 
more effective communication during hand-offs. The components in SBAR 
include: describing the situation, giving adequate and necessary background 
about the situation and patient, providing an assessment, and giving their 
recommendation. This format was familiar to many nurses and was reintroduced 
during the education process and provided on pocket cards and all RRS 
literature.  The responding hospital medicine clinician was asked to rate the 
bedside nurses on how well they used SBAR to give the information. The results 
are described in Table 4.8. 
All responders were asked via the Event Record to comment on whether 
the call to the Rapid Response Team was the appropriate or if another type of 
intervention would have been more appropriate. (Table 4.9) The most concerning 
of these responses are the cases where the team felt that a code call would have 
been most appropriate for the patient.  The education of the nurses stressed that 
a life threatening condition should lead to a code call and that if there was any 
doubt then the code team should be called.  
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Reach  
It was difficult to determine if the RRS reached all the patients who were 
eligible for the intervention. The first attempt was to look at all cardiac arrests and 
determine which ones did not have a RRS call within the 24 hours preceding the 
cardiac arrest. There were a total of 193 code calls on the University campus, 40 
of them had corresponding RRS calls. (Table 4.11) On the Memorial campus 
there were 121 code calls with 17 corresponding RRS calls. There were a total of 
129 cardiac arrests on the floor at University and 29 arrests on the floor at 
Memorial after the RRS intervention. Of the arrests after the intervention only 3 
were associated with a RR within 24 hours before the arrest. All of these were at 
University campus. Without doing a paper chart review it was not possible to 
determine if any antecedents were present 24 hours before the arrest. Code calls 
at UMMMC are not recorded with patient identifiers, so when a code sheet is not 
filled out, which happens when the call did not require a code cart, it was 
Table 4.9: Was a Rapid Response Call 
Appropriate for This Patient?  
University 
(%) 
Memorial (%) 
Yes 141(70) 61 (62) 
If not what would have been a more 
appropriate response? 
  
Code Call 15 (7) 6 (6) 
Routine Page to LIP  22 (11) 7 (7) 
Routine page to Respiratory Therapy 1 (.5) 1(1) 
Could have been handled by nursing alone 1(.5) 0 (0) 
Missing 22 (11) 23 (23) 
   
Total 202 98 
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impossible to determine what the other code calls were for. Both before and after 
the intervention less than 50% of all code calls had corresponding codes sheets 
(Table 4.11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11:  
Code calls (Med/Surg Floors Only) with Corresponding Code Sheet 
Campus 1/1/2007-12/31-2007 1/1/2008-12/31/2008 1/1/2009-12/31/2009 1/1/2010-10/31/2010 
 Code 
Calls 
Code 
Sheets 
%  Code 
Calls 
Code 
Sheet
s 
%  Cod
e 
Calls 
Code 
Sheet
s 
%  Code 
Calls 
Code 
Sheet
s 
%  
Memorial 72 26 36 51 24 47 47 16 34 58 30 52 
University 91 16 18 95 29 31 70 29 41 69 31 45 
 
 
Dose delivered 
 
There were a total of 683 Rapid Response calls 449 at the University 
Campus and 234 at Memorial. The University campus averaged 18 calls per 
month with a range from 9 to 32 and an average rate of 2.8 calls per 1000 patient 
days.  The Memorial campus averaged 10 calls per month with a range from 2 to 
21 and an average rate of 2.3 calls per 1000 pt days.  There was no statistically 
significant increase or decrease over the 24 month study period.  
Collected from the Event Record were the Rapid Response triggers, the 
bedside interventions and the disposition of the patient following the RR 
Table 4.10: Code calls with RRS Call 
 Total 
Code 
Calls 
Corresponding 
RR Call 
University 193 40 
Memorial 121 17 
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intervention. The most common outcome of the rapid response was a transfer to 
the ICU, followed by the RRT being able to treat and stabilize the patient on the 
floor. On the University campus there were some calls that did not require any 
treatment at all. Rarely did the RR call prompt a change in DNR/CMO status.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Rate of RRS Calls/1000 Patient Days 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff Perspective 
A focus group of 7 medical/surgical bedside nurses resulted in responses 
to five different areas described in Table 4.12.  
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Table 4.12: Focus Group Themes 
 
When the bedside nurse decided to call 
 
 Things were going bad but it was not a code 
 When the covering physician was not responding 
 When there seemed like there were no other options 
 When there was uncertainty about a situation 
Usage of the Triggers Criteria 
 Do not refer to the list often 
 Didn’t know there were trigger criteria 
 Rely on a “gut” feeling 
 Some of the trigger criteria are normal for surgical and other patients 
Reasons that the bedside nurses waited to call or did not call at all 
 Called the resident first and finally insisted that they deal with it or a RR would be called 
 Borderline cases waited to see if they would turn with standard interventions 
 Newer nurses tend to ask the more experienced nurses before calling themselves  
Concerns from the Bedside Nurses 
 
 When first implemented there was a slow response time  
 The House Officer is not always an effective part of the team 
 Sometimes the covering physician is not happy that the RR was called; even if they were 
not responding to the bedside nurse’s concerns 
Benefits of the Rapid Response Team 
 Covering MD is quicker to respond if they know a RR has been called 
 The RR is a fallback or a safety net when the bedside nurse is out of options 
 The RR is able to facilitate faster ICU transfers 
 Someone to call when the covering physician is unavailable or it is unclear who is 
covering the patient 
 Provides clinical support to a new Intern 
 Very good interactions with the responding Hospital Medicine Clinicians 
 It has made the bedside nurse’s job easier 
 Probably prevented codes and saved lives 
 RRT will show up when called 
 Newer nurses are being taught by the responding team  
 Other nurses will take over the patients of a nurse who has called for a RR 
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Twenty nursing survey were distributed to 10 nurse managers with a 
return of 27 surveys. Of those who responded the majority felt that the hospitals 
treated complex patients and that the RRT prevents cardiac arrests and transfers 
to the ICU as well as being able to help manage sicker patients outside of the 
ICU. Most nurses called for a RRT when their patients were sick and they could 
not reach a covering physician, though they will try to contact a physician first. 
Overall there was no concern about being criticized or that the intervention was 
being over used. Prior to the RRS, the nurses needed to contact the HO, the HO 
would triage their patient over the phone and determine the priority with which 
they would come to see the patient. According to the nurses involved in the focus 
group the RRS has improved the method of getting the HO to focus on their 
patients.  
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Table 4.13: Rapid Response Nursing Survey Results 
Questions  
1. Number of years nursing? 
 
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 Over 20 
14 4 1 1 7 
2. Approximately how many 
hours a week, on average, do 
you work?  
<20 21-30 31-40 >40  
1  5 20 1  
3. Approximate number of RRS 
calls you have made? 
0 1-3 4-6 7-10 >10 
1 8 12 6  
Rapid Response Questions Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Agree 
4. Patients in the hospital have 
complex problems 
0 2 0 10 14 
5. The RRT prevents unwell 
patients from having a cardiac 
or respiratory arrest 
1 1 3 14 8 
6. The RRT prevents ICU 
admissions from the floors 
3 6 15 2 1 
7. The RRT allows me to seek 
help for my patients when I am 
worried about them 
0 2 1 18 6 
8. The RRT is not helpful in 
managing sick patients 
outside of the ICU 
 
7 16 3 1 0 
9. When one of my patients is 
sick I call the covering doctor 
before calling a RRT 
1 1 1 17 7 
10. If I cannot contact the 
covering doctor about my sick 
patient I call a RRT 
0 2 4 16 5 
11. I am reluctant to call a RRT on 
my patients because I will be 
criticized if they are not that 
unwell 
8 15 3 1 0 
12. RRT calls are required 
because the management of 
the patient by the doctors has 
been inadequate 
9 11 3 4 0 
13. RRT calls are required 
because the management of 
the patients by the nurses has 
been inadequate 
12 9 3 3 0 
14. I would call a RRT on a patient 
I am worried about even if 
their vital signs are normal 
1 9 7 9 1 
15. I think that the RRT is 
overused in the management 
of hospital patients 
7 15 4 0 0 
16. I don’t like calling RRT 
because I will be criticized for 
not looking after my patient 
well enough 
10 15 2 0 0 
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Responding hospital medicine clinician’s response to the Rapid Response 
Calls were collected from the Event Records and were classified into different 
themes Table 4.13. There were a few areas of improvement identified including 
RRS activation for a patient with a DNR/DNI order, non-med/surg floors being 
poorly equipped for the situation, and a few situations where the RRS was not 
needed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. RRT calls reduce my skills in 
managing sick patients 
10 17 0 0 0 
18. Using RRT system increases 
my work load when caring for 
a sick patient 
11 11 3 2 0 
19. The RRT can be used to 
prevent  a minor problem from 
becoming major 
0 4 0 16 0 
20. If my patient fulfills the listed 
RRT criteria but does not look 
unwell I would not make a RRT 
call 
6 17 3 1 0 
21. RRT calls teach me how to 
better manage sick patients on 
my floor 
1 5 9 10 0 
22. The RRT has improved care 
for patients at UMMMC 
1 0 6 15 5 
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Table 4.14: Comments from the Rapid Response Event Record 
Not all comments are included most duplicate comments were not repeated; comments 
summarized and shortened when appropriate 
Barriers (Negatives) 
Pt DNR/DNI no need for RR 
Primary team did not feel comfortable calling ICU  
Floor poorly equipped for the situation  
HO and nurse supervisor were no show 
HO was looking for us to take over care of pt  
Needed code call 
Could have been dealt with by attending  
Didn’t have the right equipment in CT to assess patient 
Spent 3 hours with patient  
Full report not given  
Night float was engaged in situation prior to eventual event 
Family medicine was well aware of the situation  
Night float did not show up  
Nurse supervisor showed up after pt was sent to radiology 
Service of the RR not needed 
MDs not showing up 
Confusion over calling a code or an RR 
Encouragement (Positives) 
All parties involved very cooperative and informative; staff  knew the patient well 
All team members arrived promptly  
Appreciated RT and bedside nurse quick response  
Nursing staff great team work 
Bedside RN and floor staff very responsive; able to gather necessary info 
CT staff helpful and prepared 
ED very gracious and helpful 
Excellent bedside nurse and floor staff Cardiac fellow present very helpful 
Excellent response and input by all present 
Excellent team effort 
Good team communication/effort /work/smooth process 
Great team work by all members 
Nurse very helpful  
Suggestions for improvement 
Better HO response (or different system) 
Floors better prepared for Emergencies or RRT carry necessary equipment 
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Discussion 
Improvement interventions in healthcare require standardized methods to 
evaluate the outcomes but they also require an understanding of how the 
intervention has changed the process of healthcare delivery, and if the 
intervention is working as designed. Rapid Response Systems make intuitive 
sense. Hospitals must be giving better care to patients if they receive faster, 
higher level care at their bedside when they need it, no matter where they are in 
the hospital. The expectation is that RRS studies would show this. However, this 
is not the case. Single site studies continue to show ambiguous results. In these 
situations process evaluations, even modified ones, become necessary for 
researchers and hospital leadership to better understand how the intervention 
was implemented and used.  
Fidelity 
 The RRS was designed to have each staff member perform a different 
role with different protocols for each role. The RRS implementation team was 
responsible for most of the education of all staff before it was implemented 
hospital wide. During the study period the RRS could be activated by any staff 
member using the standardized triggers or their clinical judgment. The nurses did 
not always use the criteria as a reason to call and most often relied on “gut” 
instinct that something was wrong and their patient needed additional help. This 
was not using the RRS triggers as they were designed to be used. However 
researchers at Virginia Mason Medical Center did a retrospective medical record 
review on patients that had not received RRS intervention and found that had all 
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patients with an observable trigger would have activated the RRS 2100 times in a 
month or 3 calls per hour. The trigger criteria at Virginia Mason were similar to 
the ones used at UMMMC. The trigger criteria may be a useful guideline but it is 
likely that some clinical judgment is required to interpret triggers and identify 
those that genuinely need the immediate attention of the RRS. Future research is 
needed to determine which triggers accurately predict the need for a RRS 
intervention.  
 The majority of the calls were thought to be appropriate calls to the RR 
with a total of 19% of the calls at University and 12% of the calls at Memorial that 
the responding team thought would have been better handled by someone else. 
The most concerning possible negative outcome of the RRS would be the delay 
of a call to a code team when the patient is in a life threatening situation. Bedside 
nurses were instructed to continue to call a code for any life threatening situation, 
however, there were a total of 21 RRS calls that the team felt should have been 
code calls. Though prior studies have not addressed any unexpected negative 
consequences to the RRS, this is one worth pursuing.  
The RRS was designed to function as a team, with each member 
expected to arrive at the bedside within 5 minutes. All of the team needed to 
travel to the location of the floor except the bedside nurse. Not all members of 
the team arrived a hundred percent of the time within the five minute window and 
there were times that the bedside nurse was not available when the team arrived. 
Most of the calls were initiated for a patient who was in some type of acute 
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distress and the bedside nurse would know the most about the patient’s 
condition. This negatively impacts the ability of the rest of the team to make 
quick, accurate decisions regarding care.  
Though the RRS education was not the first time the nurses had been 
taught the SBAR techniques, it has not been a standard tool used hospital wide. 
The bedside nurses clearly differed in their usage of SBAR. The education of the 
bedside nurses included a quick summary of the use of SBAR and it was 
included in all the educational material. However, it was not the primary focus of 
the education process. Even though RRS eliminates, to a degree, the necessity 
for the calling nurse to have enough facts to convince a physician to evaluate a 
patient, it is still important that the nurse be able to communicate concerns when 
the team arrives. There was limited time and resources to develop and 
implement the RRS education. The focus of the education was on how to 
activate the team and how to identify patients who needed a RRS intervention. 
For better efficiency during a RRS call, as well as for increased communication 
among staff, staff should be more consistently and widely educated on the usage 
of SBAR and other protocols related to the RRS. 
All of the information regarding the protocols of the RRT was recorded on 
the Event Records. Though these would ideally be completed at the bedside or 
shortly after this was not always the case. Many times the Event Records were 
filled out hours or even days later. Only about 50% of the forms were collected, 
and there was much missing data on these collected forms. Therefore, these 
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data are not a reliable measurement of what actually occurred. The limited 
documentation of the RRS calls most likely occurred for a variety of reasons 
including availability and usability of the form. The forms were copied and made 
available, but at times were difficult to find. The forms were long and took time to 
complete. Returning completed forms was a multi-step process that allowed for 
the possibility of completed forms being misplaced. It is also possible that when 
no intervention was needed, no form was filled out. Based on the available 
information there was no obvious differences in the calls that generated a form 
and those that didn’t. It is important to have complete and accurate information to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of an intervention, but this was 
hindered by the limited information that the forms provided.  
Reach  
 In the absence of electronic medical records that allow for searches on 
particular symptoms or vital signs, identifying the patients who needed a RRS but 
did not receive it was the most difficult element of this process evaluation and 
could not be evaluated completely. Virginia Mason’s study of patients with 
documented triggers but with no RRS intervention showed that not only was it 
not necessary to intervene for all those patients, it wouldn’t be possible.  This 
demonstrates the need to evaluate reach by looking at the outcomes of the 
patient and tracing backwards to determine if a RRS should have been called.  
 There may be some specific types of illnesses, signs or symptoms that 
should always trigger an RRS intervention. These situations could be used to 
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develop triggers that may be more effective in identifying patients who are in an 
early clinical decline. Clinical judgment will always be vital in determining the 
types of interventions needed for each individual patient. The Event Record was 
filled out by the responding team and therefore the reason for a call that is 
recorded may not be the reason why the RRS was activated. Further study of 
reasons for activation is needed.   
A review of all the cardiac arrests and floor to ICU transfers during this 
study period showed very few of the cardiac arrests on the floors or transfers had 
a corresponding RRS. This is not, however, as accurate a measure as it should 
be. The dates and times in the different data sets did not usually line up exactly 
so it was impossible to determine which RRS call was associated with which 
arrests or transfers. Patient identifiers available in the arrest data and ICU 
transfer data but only on the information from the Event Records not the 
telecommunications logs, so it was not possible to identify patients in this way. 
 There are several options available to bedside nurses when their patients 
are in need of a higher level of care. The best assessment to determine if a 
patient should have had a RRT called would be in real time. Once the time has 
passed it becomes difficult to reconstruct all the variables and the clinical 
judgment that was involved.  
Another way to measure the reach of the RRS is to look beyond this as a 
patient care intervention and consider it a nursing support intervention. Then the 
nurses become the target of the intervention and measurement focuses on 
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whether they received the help that they needed every time they needed it. This 
would include areas that are covered by the RRS as well as the training of the 
nurses to know when to activate it. Alternatively, reach can also be measured by 
the hospital areas that are covered by the RRS, the patient population and who 
has the ability to call. About a year after full implementation, the RRS was made 
available to the diagnostic areas of the hospital, and in the future patients and 
visitors will be able to activate the RRS.  
Dose  
 Dose refers to the amount of the intervention that was provided to the 
target audience. Dose was measured in the process evaluation by the number of 
calls that the RRS received. There are no clear guidelines about the rate of calls 
that a hospital wide RRS should be receiving. A sampling of rates of calls by 
month from the RRS literature ranges from less than 2 to 111, and the calls do 
not correlate with the size of the hospitals. There are so many variables that 
could impact the number of calls that it becomes impossible to determine what 
the target number is. In order to determine if the dose of this intervention is 
correct, it would be necessary to evaluate how these patients were being helped 
before the RRS. Is this process continuing, was it successful and has it continued 
parallel to the RRS?  
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Staff Perspective  
 In many patient safety interventions the burden of execution is on the 
nurses and the success depends on their ability and willingness to implement the 
interventions. Initially there were concerns about the RRS but these came mostly 
from the hospital medicine physicians who were concerned that the use of 
triggers would create more demands on their time. Much time was spent 
investigating and debating the model and triggers to use. As the RRS started the 
responding staff realized that the triggers were not going to be over used. There 
is still a concern about the calls (n=21) that the responding staff felt should have 
been a code call.  
Table 4.15: Calls per Month from RRS Literature 
Study Hospital Size 
(number of 
beds) 
Average 
calls per 
month 
Virginia Mason 336 90 
Bellomo, 2004 400 25 
Brilli, 2007 Not reported 13 
Bristow, 2000 380-530  1.75 
Dacey, 2007 350  13 
DeVita, 2004  622  29 
Jones, 2005 400 8 
Kenward, 2003 136 11 
McFarlane, 2007 472 111 
Salamonson, 
2001 
 200 
 
8 
 
Konrad 900  29 
Lighthall 150 22 
Hanson 136 4 
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 The nurses have embraced the RRS and for the most part have found it a 
very positive experience. They admit to not really using the triggers and relying 
more on their clinical experience and intuition.  New nurses were more likely to 
consult with a senior nurse before calling the RRT. The RRS is intended to get 
help to the bedside quickly when needed. There is a possibility that having 
nurses double check before calling could have an unintended delay in getting 
help. 
Conclusion 
RRS studies do not consistently demonstrate the effectiveness of RRSs in 
reducing cardiac arrests out of ICUs, all cause hospital mortality and related 
outcomes. Hospital research, assessing health related outcomes and processes, 
is made difficult because of the wide variation in patient’s primary diagnose and 
comorbidities. As well as the causes and treatment options of acute decline.  
Defining and measuring the features of an acute decline might involve 
retrospective reviews of paper medical records especially in the absence of an 
electronic medical record. Even with medical record reviews, there could be 
differences among reviewers as to what is considered an acute decline and who 
might have benefited from a RRS. Some outcome measures can be crude, and 
affected by differences in patient characteristics over time. Even with commonly 
used adjustments, it may be difficult to validate a positive or negative effect of an 
intervention like RRS. Because of the difficulty and wide variation of RRS a 
process evaluation is a tool that could begin to shed light on how a RRS works.  
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There have not been extensive process evaluations done to determine if a 
RRS is working as it was designed to. It is difficult to evaluate the process of 
implementation and usage and how it affects the outcomes. At UMMMC, the 
RRS was most often, used as it was designed. There were some cases where 
the nurses used it as a negotiating tool by telling the HO that they help was 
needed and if they did not come, the nurse would call the RRS, thereby changing 
the way care comes to the bedside apart from formally activating the RRS. It also 
appears that the responding team is seen as an educational source for bedside 
nurses, where they are able to ask questions and get information that make them 
more confident in their care of patients. These components were not designed 
into the system but provide insight into ways the RRS can, overtime, change the 
interaction among staff and the hospital culture for the better. This modified 
process evaluation showed that there are components in each area, fidelity, 
reach, dose and staff perspective that could have contributed to the outcomes of 
the study both positively and negatively. However, more importantly, it shows 
that this intervention has been well received by the staff, especially the bedside 
nurses, and has the possibility of increased usage over time which may show 
better clinical outcomes as well.   
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion and Final Discussion 
 
primum non nocere: First do no harm 
 
“Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.”  
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
 
 RRS research has been widely published and accepted by healthcare 
improvement and hospital regulatory agencies. However, the evidence that 
RRSs are improving the care delivered to hospitalized patients is still 
inconclusive. There are multiple differences in study methodology, outcome 
definitions and statistical analysis in the published studies, and this makes it 
difficult to combine the studies meaningfully.  
The goal of the research presented in this dissertation was to examine a 
Rapid Response System that was implemented in two UMMMC hospitals. This 
was done using three separate studies; an evaluation of unanticipated ICU 
transfers before the intervention, effectiveness of the RRS on specific outcomes 
and a modified process evaluation.  
Unanticipated ICU Transfers 
 
The first study was a retrospective look at unanticipated ICU transfers that 
would indicate one area where a RRS could improve patient care. Floor to ICU 
transfers have been evaluated in other RRS research as an outcome to 
determine the effectiveness of the intervention. Understanding the scope of a 
problem before planning an intervention would provide the best circumstances in 
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which to design the best intervention. Given the Joint Commission mandate, 
there was not time to identify specific outcomes at UMMMC prior to 
implementation of the RRS. Unanticipated ICU transfers were identified as an 
area of improvement in some of the earlier RRS published studies, but little was 
known about the actual extent of the problem and what ways a RRS would 
improve it.  It was decided to evaluate the floor to ICU transfers in the year before 
there was discussion about implementing a RRS.  
Using physician review of medical records, this study attempted to 
determine the preventability and timeliness of floor to ICU transfers. The results 
of the study demonstrated that reviewers agreed that 13% of the transfers were 
preventable. The study had several limitations including limited information 
provided to reviewers, differences in interpretation of the outcome measures 
among reviewers and different opinions about the constituents of ideal care 
among the reviewers. Even with these limitations this study provided some 
evidence that there may be transfers to the ICU that could be prevented by an 
RRS if the system were triggered early in the course of clinical deterioration of 
the patient.  
 This study brought to light some of the difficulties in measuring floor to ICU 
transfers as an outcome. Preventability, as defined in this study, still required 
some unavoidable clinical judgments.  In order for the RRS to be successful in 
reducing the rate of ICU transfers, there has to be a method that would clearly 
identify cases that could have been prevented with earlier intervention. Additional 
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work is necessary to better understand the preventable cases and what type of 
similarities they have that could be translated into more accurate triggers for the 
RRS. 
Effectiveness of a RRS 
 The second study was a before and after evaluation of the effectiveness of 
a RRS in decreasing the rates of cardiac arrests on the floors and hospital wide, 
unanticipated ICU transfers and code calls outside of the ICU. It showed that 
there was a statistically significant reduction in the number of code calls at the 
University campus before and after the intervention. The other outcomes for the 
most part consistently declined in frequency during both the before and after 
periods, suggesting that a secular trend was the most likely cause of the 
differences in outcomes between the before and after periods. Though the 
preventable transfers study showed that possibly 13% of floor to ICU transfers 
could have been prevented with the implementation of a RRS, the results of this 
effectiveness study did not demonstrate a reduction in floor to ICU transfers. This 
study illustrated the difficulties in identifying appropriate definitions and 
measurement of RRS outcomes and the most accurate method for analyzing the 
results. Different type of analyses could impact the results for certain outcomes. 
In this study factors such as differences in patient populations and other hospital 
interventions were not controlled for during the two study periods, and this may 
have impacted the results.  
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Modified Process Evaluation 
Finally, the third study was a modified process evaluation of aspects of the 
implementation and use of the RRS that may have impacted outcomes in the 
second study. It showed that the RRS was not necessarily being activated using 
the agreed upon trigger criteria, was at times called when the code team was 
more appropriate and that the house officer did not always respond as expected. 
It was difficult to determine whether the RRS was being triggered for every 
patient that might benefit from it and this may have underestimated the changes 
in rates of cardiac arrests and ICU transfers in the previous study. The nurses 
were for the most part positive about the RRS, and their perception was that the 
intervention improved care.  
The Process Improvement Model and a RRS 
Quality improvement and patient safety in healthcare have lagged behind 
other quality improvement efforts in complex and potentially dangerous 
businesses such as aviation and in businesses producing products prone to 
defects such as manufacturing.  Many different improvement theories have been 
redesigned for healthcare implementation. In addition to improvement theory 
redesign, epidemiologic and bio-statistical methods have been adapted to 
measure changes related to quality improvement interventions.  
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Figure 5.1:Process Improvement 
Model  
Used with permission from IHI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoted by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement and originally 
developed by Langley et al. is the Model of Improvement. This model 
incorporates 3 questions and the Plan, Do, Study, Act action items.54  Figure 5.1 
displays the model. The model takes into account the fundamental difference 
between quality improvement intervention research and conventional scientific 
research as demonstrated in the first question, what are we trying to accomplish?  
Much of patient safety research in the past has had as a primary goal increasing 
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knowledge that may over time change healthcare processes. The Model of 
Improvement’s goal is to effect change in a continuous more immediate time 
frame. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and the traditional 
research approach may be necessary in some cases to initially guide 
development of the improvement intervention. The Model of Improvement would 
then guide the continued evaluation and improvement of the interventions using 
a standardized method.  
 “What are we trying to accomplish?” 
The RRS that we implemented had several goals, but the answer to the 
Model of Improvement’s first question was: “To improve the care of patients 
outside of the ICU who were experiencing an acute clinical decline”. It was 
anticipated that improved care would result in changes in the frequency of ICU 
transfers, Cardiac arrests and code calls. 
“How will we know that a change is an improvement?” 
This question addresses the importance of accurate measurement. Not only 
do we need to have accurate data we need to have practical and valid 
operational definitions of our outcomes and need to use validated methods of 
data collection. There are multitudes of methods to measure change in an 
outcome over time, but without careful consideration of exactly what we are 
measuring, we may fail to understand what an intervention is really doing.  Some 
RRS studies have used code calls or other proxy measures for cardiac arrests. If 
we had done that in this study and only reported the change in code calls using 
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counts we would have shown a 50% decrease since the implementation. But in 
this study the reduction of code calls did not translate into a reduction in cardiac 
arrests. 
Another outcome that some RRS studies have evaluated is hospital mortality. 
This is a rather crude outcome that is affected by many patient characteristics 
that change over time. Even with commonly used adjustments it may be difficult 
to validate a positive or negative effect on overall hospital mortality of an 
intervention like RRS, which would be expected to have only a small overall 
effect, because of the relatively small numbers that leave little room for 
improvement. A more sensitive analysis might focus on a few disease specific 
mortalities hypothesized to be more likely prevented by rapid response, such as 
sepsis related deaths among patients admitted to floor beds, death from COPD 
related to complications, or post operative deaths among those transferred to the 
floor after surgery.   
Because of the difficulty in getting the Event Records returned and the 
missing data on the ones that were returned, the data collected did not 
necessarily accurately reflect the actual events that took place. However, based 
on what was collected either an acute or significant drop in oxygen saturation 
accounted for 44% and 54% of the reported triggers at Memorial and University 
respectively. This might be an intermediate outcome in the pathway to a more 
serious decline and death.  As an example, if long duration hypoxemia is a risk 
factor for increased hospital mortality then maybe evaluating the RRS impact on 
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reducing the amount of time a patient spends with percent oxygen saturation less 
than 88 would be a more useful measure of RRS effectiveness. 
Relevant outcomes for a RRS may depend on hospital specific factors, 
specifically those areas that are in need of improvement. In some hospitals with 
limited ICU beds a successful RRS may be one that is able to stabilize a patient 
on the floor or aid in monitoring and supporting that patient on the floor. For other 
hospitals it may be to be more efficient at getting the declining patient to the ICU 
earlier in the process to provide the highest level of care, quickly in the ICU. In a 
hospital with poor nurse morale the RRS may provide much needed support and 
improve working conditions for nurses and other clinicians or to help retain well 
trained, experienced staff. In a teaching hospital the RRS may serve as a 
resource for new, inexperienced house officers for both immediate support and 
ongoing education.  Maybe the best overall measure would be an improvement 
in the overall hospital safety culture or patient satisfaction. All of these are 
important to safe, high quality care and all can be somewhat elusive to measure, 
especially in institutions that are in almost a constant state of flux. 
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“What changes can we make that will result in improvement?” 
We made a change when we implemented a RRS. It was successfully 
implemented, was well accepted and used by the nurses, and the perception of 
the nurses and other staff was that the RRS improved care outside of the ICU. 
But the statistical analysis and evaluation of the outcomes showed little change 
in the primary outcomes that had been targeted. There was minimal if any 
statistically significant change in cardiac arrests, ICU transfers or code calls. So 
did the RRS improve what we were looking to improve or were the outcomes 
perhaps not the right ones to be measuring? Did we not completely understand 
what the implementation team wanted to accomplish?  
The Model of Improvement is designed to evaluate and react to outcomes in 
a relatively short amount of time. The actual amount of time necessary to 
observe a change if one is happening will change based on the intervention and 
the outcomes being measured.  
Future of RRS Research 
A randomized controlled trial (RCT) is the most robust of any study design 
and would be the most appropriate design for evaluation of a RRS. However, 
because of the mandate by the Joint Commission that all hospitals must have a 
RRS and the ethical considerations of randomizing patients or hospitals to a RRS 
and a control, a RCT is not feasible. Another complication of using a RCT to 
evaluate a RRS is the ease with which cross contamination between trial and 
control arms might occur if randomization occurred within a hospital. Secular 
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trends unrelated to the intervention but affecting RRS outcomes could also 
reduce the power of a RCT to identify a statistically significant effect.  This is 
what likely happened in the only RCT done in 12 hospitals implementing a RRS 
and 11 that did not.12  In this study both intervention and control hospitals showed 
a decrease in the measured outcomes.  
Don Berwick formally of IHI, suggests that we stop asking “Where is the RCT” 
but rather “What is everyone learning?”.64 What we learn from failed improvement 
efforts may be just as important as what we learn from successful efforts. 
Sharing lessons from both successful and unsuccessful interventions may 
support dissemination of effective strategies and prevent others from using 
resources attempting failed interventions.     
It has been suggested that some specific challenges are involved when trying 
to effect change in large systems. A hospital may not always be a large, multi site 
system but many of the difficulties can still exist. These include delayed 
response, integration, staff behavior change and disruption to existing 
protocols.54 In terms of implementing the RRS, to some degree; all four of these 
difficulties existed and may have impacted the results of these studies.  
Delayed response is the time between implementing a change and being able 
to observe or measure the effects of that change. The amount of time that a RRS 
needs to be in place to effect measurable change in outcomes would likely be 
different depending on the different characteristics of the hospitals. The RRS at 
UMMMC was evaluated for two years after the full implementation. Because of 
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the difficulty in measuring whether the RRS reached every patient that needed it, 
and the rarity of some of the outcomes being measured, two years may not have 
been a long enough to fully evaluate all the changes that the RRS might have 
made. It is not clear how much time a RRS needs after implementation to be fully 
accepted and used to the fullest extent by all potential users. The number of calls 
did not change drastically over the study period indicating that there was no initial 
increase followed by a period of leveling off which would have been expected.  
With more education and modifications to the triggers there may be an increase 
in calls over time.  
The impact of a RRS on the safety culture of the hospital and staff satisfaction 
would need to be assessed over a greater amount of time to assess that the 
changes occurred and were sustained over time. As the RRS becomes more 
ingrained in the culture of the hospital these and other changes may be 
observed.  
Integration is the difficulty of implementing an intervention that spans multiple 
systems.  The RRS intervention included multiple hospital systems including; two 
different hospitals, multiple nursing units, office of quality and patient safety, 
critical care, nursing, hospital medicine, diagnostic areas and residency training. 
There are differences in culture and priorities in all of these departments that 
needed to be taken into account with the roll out of the intervention in each of 
these systems. Continued evaluation of the differences in uses among these 
departments would provide valuable information. The amount of time it will take 
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the nursing units to change not only the way that they contact help for their 
patients but also the mindset of when it is appropriate to contact the RRS will 
impact not only the behavior of clinical staff but also the delayed response and 
the integration of the RRS.  
Behavior change is perhaps the most challenging aspect of introducing a new 
intervention into a healthcare system. The acceptance and use of a RRS will 
depend on how it is perceived by the staff. The modified process evaluation 
indicated that the nurses felt positive about the intervention and were willing to 
use it; however, there was not a systematic use of the RRS based on the trigger 
criteria and there were several situations where the RRS was not the appropriate 
call for the situation. Some of the possible reasons that the nurses have not 
adopted the use of specific triggers may be due to the relatively limited training 
that they received, difficulty in determining when a trigger is new, and possible 
concerns of being seen as over reacting. More investigation is necessary to 
determine which signs and symptoms should always trigger a RRS call and 
those areas where clinical judgment should be used.  
Finally the RRS is a disruption to the status quo. The nurses that participated 
in the surveys or focus groups were generally happy with the change to the 
status quo. They felt that they were better able to get additional help for their 
patients after the implementation of the RRS. This, like any new intervention will 
have positives and negatives. Though this study did not investigate any potential 
negative effects of the RRS, it is probable that there were some. In this study, the 
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RRS calls that were deemed inappropriate, because a code call would have 
been better, created a delay in care for potentially life threatening conditions. 
Other possible unanticipated consequences could be the effect on other patients 
when the RRT is being pulled away from other work and possible animosity 
towards nurses for making a RRS. Surveys of team members might be useful in 
determining some of these outcomes.  
Conclusion 
Because of the differences in institutions, team make up, patient population 
and differences in data sources and outcome collection methods, RRS studies 
are difficult to compare or combine in a meaningful way. Future studies that focus 
on some of the softer outcomes such as patient or staff satisfaction with the 
RRS, changes in hospital culture and enhanced learning opportunities as well as 
hospital specific outcomes may provide more support and guidance for RRS 
development and implementation.  
RRS makes intuitive sense; it seems reasonable to think that getting a higher 
level of care to the bedside in a more timely fashion will improve patient 
outcomes. The confusion over seemingly conflicting results from studies is 
probably based more on the ability to accurately determine which outcomes to 
study and the best methods to measure those outcomes. This is will be 
accomplished in quality improvement by combining the strengths of multiple 
disciplines: clinical, system improvement theory, quality control, and research.  
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